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Sixteen and Pregnant: Minors' Consent in Abortion
and Adoption
Malinda L. Seymoret

ABSTRACT: A minor girl's decision about how to handle an unplanned
pregnancy is a highly contested issue. Especially contentious is the minor's
ability to consent to an abortion independently of an adult such as her parents
or a judge. That issue has received substantial attention from policy makers,
scholars, judges, and legislators. Almost no attention has been paid, however,
to the decision of a pregnant minor to continue her pregnancy, relinquish her
constitutionally protected parental rights, and place a child for adoption. In 37
states, a minor's abortion decision is regulated differently than an adult's, while
in only 15 states is a minor's decision to relinquish parental rights and consent
to adoption treated any differently from an adult's decision. New
neuroscientific advances in the understanding of minors' decisionmaking seem
to justify protective regulation of the adoption placement decisions of minor
mothers, as does the law's traditional treatment of minors' decisionmaking in
areas other than abortion. The justifications often advanced for the need for
parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision-the physical/medical
risks, the psychological/emotional effects, and the importance of the decisionapply with equal force to the decision about adoption placement. The decision
about adoption placement also differs from the abortion decision in at least one
crucial respect-the legal complexity of the adoption decision adds another
layer to the medical and moral decisions present in abortion. All states should

t Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. No one "builds" a law review article
on her own. I would be remiss if I failed to acknowledge the contributions of many others to this project
- I am grateful for the unflagging support of my faculty and helpful comments from faculty when I
presented this topic, the lively engagement of my Adoption Law students, the helpful library staff,
especially Laura McKinnon, who quickly and competently tracked down legal and non-legal sources
alike, and the intellectually stimulating atmosphere of TexasWesleyan University School of Law. And,
as a single mother, I know it takes a village to raise a child; thanks to Mimi, Anne and Steve for their
special assistance this summer, without which this article would not have been finished. This article is
dedicated to my children's birth mothers, who faced situations no mother should have to faceand made
decisions no mother should have to make.
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require that minor mothers have independent legal counsel when making the
decision about relinquishment of parental rights and consent to adoption
placement.
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I was sixteen and pregnant. Frightenedand so confused. I remember the
pamphlet my school nurse handed me. Pregnant? Confused? We understand.
We can help you decide which option is best for you and your baby. I needed
that. An adult who would comfort me, help me and notjudge. Blindly I walked
into the adoption agency, seeking help and information, and my life was never
the same. They used my age and my emotionsfor their own gain. Their offered
comfort came with one agenda in mind - to make sure I chose adoption for my
unborn baby. I walked in their doors as an unknowing, trusting child. I walked
out as a battered mother who lost more than she could ever imagine.

A minor girl's decisionmaking when facing an unplanned pregnancy is
almost universally considered a decision about abortion, a highly contentious
issue. Especially contentious is the minor's ability to consent to an abortion
without the interference of a substitute decisionmaker such as her parents or a
judge. That issue has received substantial attention from policy makers,
scholars, judges, and legislators. Almost no attention has been paid, however,
to the decision of a minor parent to continue her pregnancy, relinquish her
parental rights, and place a child for adoption. The assumption seems to be
that, once a decision to forgo abortion is made, the decision to place a child for
adoption rather than raising the child as a single teen parent is the only rational
choice under the circumstances, so no protections are needed to protect that
minor mother's interests. Thus, in the vast majority of states, a pregnant minor
can go through labor and delivery without her parents knowing. A pregnant
minor can also relinquish her parental rights in order to place that child for
adoption without her parents knowing. In fact, in all but fifteen states, a minor
can make the consequential decision of voluntarily terminating her parental
rights without the advice of legal counsel, without a guardian ad litem
representing her interests, and without any adult in the room other than the
http://www.blogger.com/
1. Cassi Bella Ward, User Profile: Cassi, BLOGGER.COM,
profile/00274531213087340905 (last visited Mar. 29, 2013). The dominant public discourse about
adoption in America is from the viewpoint of adoptive parents. See, e.g., KRISTI BRIAN, REFRAMING
TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION:

ADOPTED KOREANS, WHITE PARENTS AND THE POLITICS OF KINSHIP 4

(2012). The work of legal scholars also tends to privilege the viewpoint of adoptive parents, while
minimizing the perspective of birth parents. See, e.g., Shani King, Challenging Monohumanism: An
Argument/fbr Changingthe Way We Think About InternationalAdoption, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 413, 44144 (2009) (identifying the "Invisible Birth Parents Narrative" in law review articles). As Twila Perry
notes, most scholarship about adoption is from the perspective of adoptive parents, and "there is very
little literature, legal or non-legal, which discusses the feelings of women who have given children up
for adoption, or who have had their children taken from them through the involuntary termination of
parental rights. The gap is a glaring one, and there is a clear need to remedy the situation." Twila Perry,
Transracial and International Adoption: Mothers, Hierarchy, Race, and Feminist Legal Theory, 10
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 101, 157 (1998). As a small attempt to remedy the omission Perry identified,
this Aticle includes the stories of birth mothers describing the decision to relinquish parental rights in
their own words.
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representative of an adoption agency or adoptive parents. By contrast, in the
vast majority of states, a pregnant minor cannot terminate her pregnancy
without her parents knowing, unless a judge approves.2
The difference between the treatment of minors' abortion decisions and
minors' adoption decisions is in some ways inexplicable. The decisions share a
number of similarities that suggest that similar protections against minors'
arguably less capable decisionmaking should be employed. In addition, the
decisions are different in one significant way that suggests additional
protections are necessary for the minor's decision about relinquishing parental
rights, regardless of whether minors are competent to make the decision about
abortion. After all, the decision about whether to have an abortion is a medical
decision, and in the eyes of many, a moral decision. The decision about
relinquishing parental rights also implicates medical decisionmaking in
carrying the pregnancy to term and moral decisionmaking in choosing
adoption. In addition, the decision about adoption is one involving complex
legal questions about constitutionally protected parental rights and
responsibilities that the minor is choosing to forgo. The complexities of legal
decisionmaking may require additional protections for minors relinquishing for
adoption that may not be necessary for minors seeking an abortion.
One frequent argument for parental notification in teen abortions is that
parents ought to know about medical procedures performed on their
children. The same argument applies when minor children give birth, a medical
procedure that the minor parent's own parents would seem to have a similar
interest in knowing about. The risk of death and medical complications is
greater with childbirth than with abortion, after all. The other popular
argument rests on the moral significance of the decision-deciding whether to
have an abortion is so important that minors ought to have the advice of adults
in making the decision. Parents can serve in that role, and if there is some
reason why they should not be notified, then a judge can evaluate whether a
minor is sufficiently mature to make the decision on her own.4 Why don't we
afford similar treatment to another extremely important and significant
decision: whether to terminate parental rights and place a child for adoption?
One answer to the different treatment of these similar decisions rests in the
purpose of abortion restrictions. The story of abortion restrictions is one of
restricting the autonomy of women and girls. The real purpose of parental
consent and notification statutes is not to promote informed decisionmaking by
vulnerable minors, but to discourage abortion altogether-part of a larger

2. For discussion of these laws, see infra notes 183-195 .
3. See infra notes 245-260 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 183-203 and accompanying text.
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strategy to end abortion.5 Viewed in this way, parental involvement statutes are
not just about parental rights, informed consent in medical procedures, or the
decisionmaking capacity of minors. They are instead a curtailment of women's
autonomy in sexual and reproductive matters. Requiring additional protections
of minors in making the decision to relinquish parental rights and place a child
for adoption, however, can be tailored to empower minors to make an
intelligent, knowing, and voluntary choice.
This Article will explore the legal differences in the treatment of a minor's
decision to have an abortion versus a minor's decision to place a child for
adoption. Part I will examine attitudes toward teen pregnancy, teen parenting,
and adoption, supporting the argument that these attitudes privilege adoption
over child-rearing by teens and thereby mask the need for protection of minors'
decisions around adoption. Part II will set out the scientific research on the
ability of minors to engage in competent decisionmaking and the legal history
of minors' decisionmaking in a number of areas. Part III will explore the legal
limitations on minors' decisionmaking in abortion and adoption placement,
highlighting the different legal treatment of these decisions. Part IV will
explore various justifications for parental notification in minors' abortions and
consider their applicability to minors' decisions about adoption placement.
Finally, Part V will propose statutory reforms to ensure that a minor's decision
about relinquishing parental rights and placing a child for adoption is wellinformed and voluntary. This section proposes that, given the legal nature of
the decision facing a teen considering relinquishing her parental rights and
placing a child for adoption, states should require that all minors be represented
by independent legal counsel during the placement process.

I. UNWED PREGNANCY, TEEN PREGNANCY & TEEN PARENTING

You couldn't be an unwed mother. Motherhood was synonymous with
marriage. If you weren't married,your child was a bastard and those terms
were used. I think I'm like many other women who thought, "It may kill me to
do this, but my baby is going to have what everybody keeps saying is best for
him." It's not because the child wasn't wanted. There would have been
nothing more wonderful than to come home with my baby.
5. BARBARA HINKSON CRAIG & DAVID M. O'BRIEN, ABORTION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 89
(1993); J. SHOSHANNA EHRLICH, WHO DECIDES?: THE ABORTION RIGHTS OF TEENS 22 (2006); HELENA
SILVERSTEIN, GIRLS ON THE STAND: HOW COURTS FAIL PREGNANT MINORS 19 (2007).

6. This Article deals only with voluntary relinquishment of parental rights, not with involuntary
termination of parental rights for reasons of abuse or neglect. It is only in the first category where issues
of consent occur.
7. Glory, an unwed mother interviewed in ANN FESSLER, THE GIRLS WHO WENT AWAY: THE
HIDDEN HISTORY OF WOMEN WHO SURRENDERED CHILDREN FOR ADOPTION IN THE DECADES BEFORE

ROE V. WADE 11 (2006) (quoting an interview with Glory, an unwed mother).
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We hear frequently about the "problem" of teen pregnancy. Most view
teen pregnancy in a negative light, although there is, perhaps, less agreement on
what is problematic about teen pregnancy. And what is considered problematic
about teen pregnancy has differed over time, and often depended on the race of
the minor mother. Thus, what we see as "teen pregnancy" is as much an issue
of culture as biology. Race matters in how we define the problem and how we
formulate the solution, as do attitudes toward sexuality, marriage, and adoption.
The formulation of the problem as one of teen pregnancy also masks the
involvement of men and boys-the focus is on the girl's pregnancy, not on how
she became pregnant. The male partner in the pregnancy becomes important
only when talk of a solution to the problem turns to marriage. Even when
adoption is seen as the solution to teen pregnancy, the biological father is seen
as largely irrelevant; it is only rarely that the unwed father's consent is required
in adoption.9 In Lehr v. Robertson,'0 the Supreme Court held that an unwed
father was not granted constitutional protection as a father by reason of biology
alone. He can only have an opportunity interest in becoming a father." To
take advantage of that opportunity he must take affirmative steps, such as living
with the mother and child as a family unit,12 developing a relationship with the
child,13 providing financial and emotional support during pregnancy and child
rearing,14 or filing in the state's putative father's registry.' 5 Thus, the cultural,
historical, and legal treatment of teen pregnancy is almost exclusively the
"problem" of teen mothers.

8. See Deborah L. Rhode, Politicsand Pregnancy: Adolescent Mothers and Public Policy, I CAL.
REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 99, 99 (1992).

9. See Elizabeth Brandt, Cautionary Tales of Adoption: Addressing the Litigation Crisis at the
Moment ofAdoption, 4 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 187, 192-93 (2005); Robbin Pott Gonzalez,
The Rights of Putative Fathers to Their Infant Children in Contested Adoptions: Strengthening State
Laws that Currently Deny Adequate Protection, 13 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 39, 40 (2006); Laura Oren,
Unmarried Fathers and Adoption: "Perfecting" or "Abandoning" an Opportunity Interest, 36 CAP. U.
L. REv. 253, 255 (2007); Jeffrey A. Parness, Systematically Screwing Dads: Out of Control Paternity
Schemes, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 641, 657, 668-69 (2008).
10. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
11. Id.at261.
12. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392-93 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 64852 & 650 n.4 (1972).
13. See, e.g., Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1236 (Cal. 1992).
14. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 967, 971 (Fla. 1995).
15. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 264-65.
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A. The Problem
Is the problem of teen pregnancy one of early sexuality? 6 Early
childbearing?1 7 At certain points in our history, rates of early childbearing
(which necessitates early sexuality) were substantially higher than today's
rates. In the 1950s, for example, the teen birthrate reached 97 per thousand,' 8
while in 2010 the teen birthrate was only 34.3 per thousand.19 Of course, in the
1950s, almost all teenage mothers were married, at least by the time their
babies were born.20 That is not the case today, given the decline in teen
marriage. 2 '
So is the problem one of "unwed" pregnancy, representing the immorality
of premarital sex, or one of the difficulty of single child-rearing? As to sex
outside of marriage, there is nothing new about that. Even during the time of
the Puritans, whose very name conjures up visions of being "prudish, ascetic,
and antisexual,"22 premarital sex existed. In seventeenth-century America,
possibly one in three brides in the Chesapeake Bay Colony was pregnant when
married, as was one in ten in Massachusetts. 23 Still, unwed births remained low
during this time, at one to three percent.24 So during this era, the solution for
16. Issues of morality aside, there are health risks associated with early sexuality. See Riittakerttu
Kaltiala-Heino et al., Early Puberty and Early Sexual Activity Are Associated with Bulimic-Type Eating
Pathology in Middle Adolescence, 28 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 346, 350 (2001) (observing that early
sexual activity is linked to bulimia); Donald P. Orr et al., Premature Sexual Activity as an Indicator of
Psychosocial Risk, 87 PEDIATRICS 141, 144-45 (1991) (fnding that early sexual activity correlates with
increased drug use, delinquency, and suicide attempts); Theo G.M. Sandfort et al., Long-Term Health
Correlates of Timing of Sexual Debut: Results From a National US Study, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 155,
159 (2008) (associating early sexual debut with certain long-term negative sexual health outcomes,
including increased sexual risk behaviors and problems in sexual functioning).
17. For a discussion of physical risks of early pregnancy and childbirth, see infra notes 255-260 and
accompanying text.
18. KRISTIN LUKER, DUBIOUS CONCEPTIONS: THE POLITICS OF TEENAGE PREGNANCY 8 n.21
(1996) (citing NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, ADVANCE REPORT OF FINAL NATALITY
STATISTICS 1-5 (1987)).
19. BRADY E. HAMILTON & STEPHANIE J. VENTURA, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
BIRTH RATES FOR U.S. TEENAGERS REACH HISTORIC LOWS FOR ALL AGE AND ETHNIC GROUPS (2012),

www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db89.pdf.
20. LUKER, supra note 18, at 8. The rate of births to unmarried teen parents increased from the
1950s. In 1970, about 30% of teen births were to unmarried parents; in 1980, the rate was about 50%,
and by 1995, 70%. Id. at 92. In 2010, 87% of teen births were to unmarried couples. Teen Births, CHILD
TRENDS DATABASE, http://www.childtrendsdatabank.org/?q=node/52 (last visited July 17, 2012).
21. Teen marriage peaked in the 1970s, then declined steadily through 1981. BARBARA FOLEY
WILSON, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, TEENAGE MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, UNITED

STATES 1970-81, at 1 (1985), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_21/sr21_043.pdf. According to the
Center for Disease Control and Prevention, "[t]he steady upward climb in the percent unmarried reflects
the fact that very few teenagers are marrying." STEPHANIE J. VENTURA ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP. VOL. 49, No. 10, BIRTHS TO TEENAGERS IN THE

UNITED STATES, 1940-2000, at 4 (2001), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr49/nvsr49_10.pdf.
22. JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN
AMERICA 15 (1988).
23. LUKER, supra note 18, at 17; Rhode, supra note 8, at 101 (citing D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN,

supra note 22, at 10, 32).
24. Rhode, supranote 8, at 101.
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an unwed pregnancy was typically marriage, thus avoiding single child rearing
for the most part.25 Historically, this varied in different communities. Legal
marriage was not an option for most African American slaves, 26 giving a
different connotation to "premarital sex;" sexual norms for them differed from
those for whites. 27 While African American slaves "did not condone
indiscriminate sexual relations, the slave community accepted rather than
stigmatized children born outside of marriage." 28
Even today, the connection between unwed pregnancy and single-parent
child rearing is weaker than many assume. Much single-parent child rearing
occurs because previously married partners are not sharing child-rearing
responsibilities, not because the child is born to unmarried parents. 29 Even
children born to unmarried parents are likely to be raised by two parents, given
the rates at which unwed teen mothers subsequently marry. 30 And, in the
1990s, at the height of the teen pregnancy "epidemic," one in three pregnant
teens was actually married.3'
The rate of unwed pregnancy through the period of increased urbanization
and industrialization of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is a
contested matter, with historians disagreeing about when, whether, and why
32
unwed pregnancy waxed and waned.
Some scholars estimate that at its
highest point, an estimated thirty percent of brides were pregnant at the time of
marriage. 33 At its lowest point in the mid-nineteenth century, the rate of
premarital pregnancy declined to ten percent, fueled by religious revival and
moral reform movements. 34 Again, a hastily arranged marriage was the

25. "Bastardy" resulted in punishment of the parents and attempts by civic and religious authorities
to force marriage. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 32.
26. Marriages did occur, and were ritualized and celebrated, but they were not legal. Id. at 99.
27. Id. at 13, 97-98.
28. Id. at 65.
29. Divorce accounts for a large percentage of single-parent families. NANCY E. DOWD, IN
DEFENSE OF SINGLE-PARENT FAMILIES xiii (1997) (claiming that sixty percent of single-parent families
are previously married parents); America's Families and Living Arrangements: 2010, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU tbl. FG6, http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2010.html (showing
that 44.8% of single mothers and 29.5% of single fathers never married).
30. LUKER, supra note 18, at 157 (reporting that in 1980-1981, 50% of teen pregnancies were to
married couples, while 20% of the pregnant, unmarried teens were married within a year of the birth,
and 40% married within three years). In addition, one survey found that 40% of unmarried teen fathers
reported living with the child during the first year of the child's life. Id. (citing William Marsiglio,
Adolescent Fathers in the United States: Their Initial Living Arrangements, Marital Experience, and
Educational Outcomes, 19 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 240 (1987)). Data from the National Survey of Families
and Households showed that 22% of children of unmarried teens had teen mothers living in a "stable
relationship." Id. (citing Larry Bumpass & James Sweet, Children s Experience in Single-Parent
Families: Implicationsof Cohabitationand Marital Transition, 21 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 256 (1989)).
31. LUKER, supra note 18, at 142-43.
32. MARIS A. VINOVSKIS, AN "EPIDEMIC" OF ADOLESCENT PREGNANCY?: SOME HISTORICAL AND
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 13-15 (1988).
33. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 32; Rhode, supra note 8, at 101.
34. VINOVSKIS, supra note 32, at 10 (observing that the U.S., unlike European countries,
experienced a sharp decline in unwed pregnancy in the early nineteenth century); Rhode, supra note 8,
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solution for premarital sex that resulted in a pregnancy.35 The primary
"problem" of unwed pregnancy at this time was one of morality; a woman was
stigmatized by a nonmarital pregnancy because it constituted proof of
nonmarital sex. During this period and continuing into later periods, middleclass African Americans also followed these stigmatizing norms, seeking to
distance themselves from "the image of immorality that white culture projected
onto the black lower class." 36 Poor urban and rural African Americans, on the
other hand, tended not to stigmatize premarital sexual experience and accepted
nonmarital births.37
The rates of teen and unwed pregnancy fluctuated throughout the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth century, peaked in 1957, and have been
generally declining since then.38 This fact is surprising to many because of the
rhetoric, starting in the 1970s, about an "epidemic" of teen pregnancy. 39 One
scholar persuasively argues that the "epidemic" of adolescent pregnancy in the
1970s was a myth, unmoored from any historical context that would have
identified adolescent pregnancy as part of an ongoing historical trend rather
than a modem-day crisis.40 Some demographic shifts at this time did, however,
show marked changes in teen pregnancy. First, teen pregnancy rates declined
between 1960 and 1977, although the number of pregnant teens did not decline
because of the increased number of teenagers in the population.41 Second,
teens were becoming pregnant at younger ages than in years past. The birthrate
among 18- to 19-year-old women declined by one-third from 1966 to 1977,
while the birthrate for 10- to 14-year-old girls increased by one-third. 42 Also,
during this time period, because of delayed marriage, the number of unmarried
births among teenagers increased dramatically. 43 These demographic shifts laid
the groundwork for a shift of focus from the immorality of teen pregnancy to
at 102 (stating that the "growth of religious revival movements and moral reform societies" contributed
to the decline in rates of premarital pregnancy).
35. Marriage was always an imperfect solution, of course. Indentured servants and slaves had no
right to marry, and marriages between partners of different races were not legal until the 1960s in many
states. Naomi Cahn, Birthing Relationships, 17 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 163, 174 (2002).
36. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 272; see also REGINA KUNZEL, FALLEN WOMEN,
PROBLEM GIRLS: UNMARRIED MOTHERS AND THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF SOCIAL WORK 1890-1945,

at 160 (1993).
37.

D'EMILIO& FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 272-73.

38. VINOVSKIS, supra note 32, at 25 ("The rate of teenage childbearing increased sharply after
World War II and reached a peak of 97.3 births per 1,000 women ages 15 to 19 in 1957. After 1957 the
rate of teenage fertility declined.").
39. Id. at 22-25; see also LUKER, supra note 18, at 81 ("In the early 1970s the phrase 'teenage
pregnancy' was just not part of the public lexicon. By 1978, however, a dozen articles per year were
being published on the topic.").
40. VINOVSKIS, supra note 32, at 24-25, 36-37.

41. Id. at 25.
42. Id. at 26. This increase in birthrates in younger girls still represents a small portion of teen
births. In 1983, girls fourteen years old and younger were responsible for 9,752 births, which represents
only two percent of all teen births. Id. at 27.
43. Id. at 28-29 (noting that the number of out-of-wedlock births to girls ages fifteen to nineteen
more than doubled between 1960 and 1977).
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economic and social concerns about teen parenting and the consequent burden
to society.
At this time, the "problem" of teen pregnancy tended to be seen as an
increased burden to society, especially when taken together with expansions of
government programs for poor families.4 4 In 1975, for example, the federal
government disbursed $4.65 billion through the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program to households of mothers who were
teens at the time of their first births.45 Unlike earlier periods when marriage
solved the economic problem of supporting the progeny of teens, marriage for
this age group was in decline. In addition, there was a substantial decline in
unmarried mothers placing children for adoption. While at least half of
unmarried mothers placed their children for adoption in the 1950s, in the 1970s,
ninety percent of unmarried mothers chose to parent their children. 46 As a
backlash against this pattern of parenting, society constructed a counter-image:
"The image of the young black mother on welfare relayed a message: sexual
freedom extracted a high personal priceA 7
The 1980s and 1990s brought more talk of an "epidemic" of teen
pregnancy. 48 Birthrates among teens did increase during these decades, but
made marked declines in the twenty-first century. 49 As the number of
teenagers raising children, as opposed to placing them for adoption, increased,
the "problem" of teen pregnancy became identified as the negative social
consequences of teen pregnancy and childrearing on mothers and children. The
litany is familiar: minor mothers complete, on average, fewer years of school,
are less likely to graduate high school, and are less likely to go on to college.50
Minor mothers have more children in their lifetime than do mothers who delay
first pregnancy to adulthood, and have those children at closer intervals.
Fewer educational attainments and larger families mean that "adolescent
44. Id. at 30. These financial concerns were not novel; anti-bastardy laws in colonial America arose
in part from a concern that the populace should not be burdened with the cost of raising fatherless
children. LUKER, supranote 18, at 17.
45. VINOVSKIS, supra note 32, at 30. See also NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISKING THE FUTURE:

ADOLESCENT SEXUALITY, PREGNANCY, AND CHILDBEARING 132-33 (1987) (noting that approximately
50-56% of AFDC funds in 1975 were directed to households in which the mother's first child was born
while she was a teen).
46. VINOVSKIS, supra note 32, at 29-30 & n.14. One commentator notes that it is difficult to
identify the precise cause of such a radical change in behavior but suggests that "[tihe rise of the
women's movement, the sexual revolution, the greater availability of abortion (which made out-ofwedlock childbearing truly a choice), and the increasing fragility of marriage all no doubt contributed to
the astonishing shift in the social meaning of illegitimacy." LUKER, supra note 18, at 97.
47. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 300.
48. LUKER, supra note 18, at 81.
49. GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, U.S. Teenage Pregnancies,Births and Abortions: National and State
Trends and Trends by Race and Ethnicity, tbl. 1.0 (2010) (finding the highest rates of teen pregnancy in
1989, 114.9 per 1,000; and 1990, 116.3 per 1,000; then a steady decline until 2005, to 69.5 per 1,000).
HAMILTON & VENTURA, supra note 19 (finding a teen birthrate in 2010 of 34.3 per 1,000).
50. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supranote 45, at 125-28.
51. Id. at 130.
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mothers are less likely to find stable and remunerative employment than their
peers who delay childbearing."52 Teen mothers are disproportionately poor and
dependent on social welfare programs. Children raised by single teen mothers
are likely to be raised in poverty, engage in drug use and other delinquent
behavior, perform poorly in school, and repeat the cycle by becoming
adolescent parents themselves. 54
But it is less certain today that these problems are related to teenage
childbearing rather than the underlying poverty that is a risk factor for teenage
pregnancy. More recent studies reveal a more nuanced picture of whether teen
childbearing is causative of these problems. When comparing teens from the
same socioeconomic bracket, "a few pioneering studies have called into
question the methodological error of assuming that teens who became mothers
would have had the same life trajectories as teens who did not, had they
delayed pregnancy."55 For example, when researchers compared similarly
situated girls who parented to girls who experienced miscarriages, they found
that many of the negative consequences of teen childbearing were less than
expected and relatively short-lived:
By the time a teen mother reaches her late twenties, she appears to
have only slightly more children, is only slightly more likely to be [a]
single mother, and has no lower levels of educational attainment than
if she had delayed her childbearing to adulthood. In fact, by this age
teen mothers appear to be better off in some aspects of their lives.
Teenage childbearing appears to raise levels of labor supply,
accumulated work experience and labor market earnings and appears
to reduce the chances of living in poverty and participating in the
associated social welfare programs.56
As further support for findings that teen pregnancy does not cause poverty
or other social ills, but instead arises in situations where poverty already exists,
one study that followed teen mothers into their thirties found that mothers with
childhood advantages fared better over time than impoverished mothers.57 In

52. Id.
53. Id. at 131-34 (noting that in 1985, the total welfare, food stamp, and Medicare outlay
attributable to teen childrearing amounted to $16.6 billion).
54. Id. at 134-38.
55. Arielle F. Shanok & Lisa Miller, Stepping Up to Motherhood Among Inner-City Teens, 31
PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 252, 252 (2007).

56. V. Joseph Hotz et al., Teenage Childbearingand its Life Cycle Consequences: Exploiting a
NaturalExperiment (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7397, 1999). See also Melissa
Kearney & Phillip Levine, Why is the Teen Birth Rate in the United States so High and Why Does It
Matter?, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 141, 141-42 (2012) (arguing that the negative consequences of teen birth
"are simply the continuation of the original low economic trajectory").
57. Lee SmithBattle, Legacies of Advantage and Disadvantage: The Case of Teen Mothers, 24
PUB. HEALTH NURSING 409 (2007).
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other words, teens who were poor when they became pregnant remained poor,
as did poor teens who miscarried, and less poor pregnant teens remained less
poor. This research calls into question long-held assumptions that teen
parenting creates a negative life trajectory for teens.
Other studies suggest some positive consequences of pregnancy and
parenting for teen mothers. In a study focusing on inner city youth, pregnancy
and childbearing led to a "heightened sense of purpose connected with
increased health and safety-conscious behaviors."58 Teen mothers report that
motherhood "provided them with a priority in life, together with a
determination to achieve things for both themselves and their children."S9 One
study reveals that girls who parent their children have no different juvenile
delinquency rates than never-pregnant girls, and that girls who have abortions
or place their children for adoption have substantially higher rates of juvenile
delinquency than those who parent. A number of legal and societal changes
have also ameliorated some of the negative effects of teen pregnancy. For
example, since 1972, it has been illegal for public schools to discriminate on
the basis of pregnancy status, thereby allowing many pregnant girls to continue
their education.61
As society struggles with identifying the problematic aspects of teen
pregnancy, shifting from concerns about immorality and the impropriety of
single parenthood to concerns about the financial costs of supporting single
mothers and the negative societal consequences of teen pregnancy, unwed
pregnancy, teen childbearing, and teen child rearing, it also struggles with
identifying solutions for those problems.
58. Shanok & Miller, supra note 55, at 258. See also J.D. Arenson, Strengths & Self-Perceptions of
Parenting in Adolescent Mothers, 49 J. PEDIATRIC NURSING 251 (1994) (showing major positive
behavior changes during pregnancy continued post-natally); Linda Davies et al., Creating a Family:
Perspectives From Teen Mothers, 12 J. PROGRESSIVE HUMAN SERVICES 83 (2001) (showing that
mothers used pregnancy as an opportunity to strive for a better life); Trina L. Hope et al., The
Relationships Among Adolescent Pregnancy, PregnancyResolution, and Juvenile Delinquency, 44 SOC.
Q. 555 (2003) (showing that, unlike adolescent girls who end pregnancy through abortion, girls who
parent experience a dramatic reduction in smoking and marijuana use); Janna Lesser, Sometimes You
Don't Feel Ready to be an Adult or a Mom: The Experience of Adolescent Pregnancy, II J. CHILD &
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC NURSING 7 (1998) (showing that pregnant teens stopped smoking, drinking
alcohol and taking drugs as a response to their pregnancies); Lee SmithBattle, "I Wanna Have a Good
Future:" Teen Mothers' Rise in Educational Aspirations, Competing Demands, and Limited School
Support, 38 YOUTH & SOC'Y 348 (2007) (showing that, regardless of pre-pregnancy school
performance, motherhood motivated teens to get better grades, resolve to graduate, and aspire to attend
college).
59. Jan Richards et al., Adolescent Motherhood: A Q-Methodological Re-Evaluation of
Psychological and Social Outcomes, 17 J. COMMUNITY & APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 347, 358 (2007).
60. Hope et al., supra note 58, at 565.
61. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000) ("[N]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."); 34 C.F.R. §106.40(b)(1) (2005)
(a school "shall not discriminate against any student, or exclude any student from its education program
or activity, including any class or extracurricular activity, on the basis of such student's pregnancy").
Even before passage of that law, some pregnant minors sued and won the right to attend public schools.
See, e.g., Ordway v. Hargraves, 323 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Mass. 1971).
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B. The Solution
Attitudes toward unwed pregnancies and teen pregnancies have changed
over time, as have the perceived solutions for these identified problems. Social
and public policy have always focused on prevention-either prevention of
pregnancy, through abstinence or access to birth control (including sterilization
of "unfit" parents), or prevention of childbirth through abortion. But once a
pregnancy occurred, and was likely to be brought to term because of the
unavailability of abortion, solutions varied over time. During the Puritan era,
the solution for an unwed pregnancy was typically marriage, thus avoiding
single child rearing in large part.62 Again, during the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, a hastily arranged marriage was the solution for premarital
sex that resulted in a pregnancy.63
With increased urbanization,
industrialization, and mobility, it became easier for fathers to avoid marriage,
so new solutions needed to be found.64
Adoption did not become a perceived solution to the problem of unwed or
teen pregnancy until after World War II. Prior to that point, social and public
policy called for keeping unwed mothers and their children together. "Family
preservation was the creed of early-twentieth-century child welfare
reformers."66 Separating mother and child was thought to be damaging to the
child, harmful to the mother, and dangerous for the adoptive parents.67
Adoption would deny the child the "real mother love" it was entitled to, and

62. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 32 (describing steps the Puritans took to punish

bastardy, including forced marriage); Rhode, supra note 8, at 101 (noting that rates of bastardy in
Puritan America were as low as one to three percent, though an estimated one in three brides were
pregnant at the time they married).
63. Marriage was always an imperfect solution, of course. Indentured servants and slaves had no
right to marry, and interracial marriages were not legal. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 12
(noting that indentured servants could not marry), 34-37 (describing the legal prohibitions on interracial
marriage), 99 (noting that, as the property of their masters, slaves did not have the legal right to marry).
64. Rachel F. Moran, How Second-Wave Feminism Forgot the Single Woman, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV.
223, 247-48 (2004). As Moran notes, "Urbanization and industrialization made men considerably more
mobile than they had been in small, rural communities, and the bonds of marriage and family grew
increasingly tenuous." Id. According to D'Emilio & Freedman, premarital pregnancy rates increased and
marriages could no longer be forced because of greater geographic mobility, the breakdown of the
traditional community, and familial regulation of marriage and sexuality, thus increasing the bastardy
rates at this time. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 43-44. Indeed, women who were no longer
protected by community enforcement of moral codes found it "harder to insure that premarital
intercourse would lead to marriage in the event of pregnancy." Id. at 44.
65. "The number of nonfamily adoptions per year went from approximately 8,000 in 1937 to over
70,000 in 1965." FESSLER, supra note 7, at 183.
66. ELLEN HERMAN, KINSHIP BY DESIGN: A HISTORY OF ADOPTION IN THE MODERN UNITED

STATES 28 (2008). See also Cahn, supra note 35, at 17.
67. HERMAN, supra note 66, at 29. See also LUKER, supra note 18, at 37, for a social reformer's
description of the biological progenitors of a child born outside marriage: "The typical illegitimate child,
then, may be said to be the offspring of a young mother of inferior status mentally, morally and
economically; and of a father who is probably a little superior to the mother in age, mentality, and
economic status, if not in morals."
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would deny the birth mother an "incentive for right living."68 Furthermore,
there was little interest in adoption at that time because of strong beliefs in
behavioral heredity-the children of women who had sex out of wedlock were
thought to have "bad blood," and consequently, "blood will tell." 69 Adoptive
parents would be saddled with children genetically predisposed to bad
behaviors "which cause family heartache." 70
Until the 1930s, unwed mothers were encouraged by social reformers,
evangelical maternity homes, and social workers to keep their babies. 7' Several
states joined in, enacting legislation designed to discourage the separation of
mother and infant. 72 One form these laws took was mandatory breast-feeding
and bonding laws that required unwed mothers in maternity homes to remain
with their children for a number of months before the children could be
relinquished for adoption.
Even in states without such regulations, many
maternity homes required expectant mothers to agree not to relinquish their
children, 74 or to remain in the maternity home for at least six months following
birth even if they intended to relinquish the child for adoption.7 5 In Minnesota,
adoption placement by unwed mothers was allowed only "if it seem[ed]
necessary under all the circumstances." 76 Thus, the expectation before World
War II was that teen and unwed mothers would parent their children. In the
African American community, there had long been that expectation that teen
and unwed mothers would parent their children. Some attributed this attitude
to a "cultural acceptance" of illegitimacy that was either "rooted in preslavery
African traditions," or to patterns that were "born of the conditions of
enslavement in the United States."77 Others offer a more instrumental rationale
for African American mothers parenting their children-there was little interest
among majority-white adoptive parents in adopting black babies.78
As social workers professionalized in the 1930s and 1940s, there was a
change in attitude toward adoption of white children by social workers. While
social reformers saw the child of the unmarried mother as "a tool in the

68.
69.
70.
71.

HERMAN, supra note 66, at 29.
Id. at 30.
Id.
RICKIE SOLINGER, WAKE UP LITTLE SUZI: SINGLE PREGNANCY AND RACE BEFORE ROE V.

WADE 21 (2d ed. 2000); Cahn, supra note 35, at 174.
72. Cahn, supra note 35, at 175. For example, Maryland enacted a law in 1916 that established
criminal penalties for the separation of mothers from their children under six months old. Id. (citing
U.S. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, THE WELFARE OF INFANTS OF ILLEGITIMATE BIRTH IN BALTIMORE AS
AFFECTED BY A MARYLAND LAW OF 1916 GOVERNING THE SEPARATION FROM THEIR MOTHERS OF
CHILDREN UNDER SIX MONTHS OLD 1, 12 (1925)). See also KUNZEL, supra note 36.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

HERMAN, supra note 66, at 34; Cahn, supra note 35, at 174-75.
KUNZEL, supra note 36, at 33; Cahn, supra note 35, at 176.
KUNZEL, supra note 36, at 88-90.
Cahn, supra note 35, at 175.
KUNZEL, supra note 36, at 157.
LUKER, supra note 18, at 161; SOLINGER, supra note 71, at 57.
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redemption of the mother," 79 social workers began to see their client as the
child, separate from the interests of the mother.80 Increasingly, social workers
saw adoption as serving the best interests of the child-or, at least, of white
children.8 1
Social workers began to pressure unmarried mothers to surrender their
children for adoption instead of parenting them:
When a Door of Hope resident expressed her desire to keep her baby,
her social worker "worked with her, trying to show her how important
it would be that the child be given every possible consideration. We
tried to point out to her that possibly if the child was placed for
adoption, it would get things that she could not possibly give to him."
Another unmarried mother recognized the influence social workers
could exert, even when trying to remain neutral: "It's not what Mrs. K.
says exactly, it's just that her face lights up when I talk about adoption
the way it doesn't when I talk about keeping Beth."82
One scholar describes this time in American adoption history as a time of
"pressure, coercion, and inhumanity in procuring consents." 83 The underlying
attitude of adoption professionals was that an unmarried woman and her child
did not constitute a family, as evidenced by the following quote from an agency
head:
An agency has a responsibility of pointing out to the unmarried mother
the extreme difficulty, if not the impossibility, if she remains
unmarried, of raising her child successfully in our culture without
damage to the child and to herself .... The concept that the unmarried
mother and her child constitute a family is to me unsupportable. There
is no family in any real sense of the word.84
In denying parent/child dyads the status of family, social workers
privileged the normative family, and viewed these dyads as "'a blow at the
solidarity of the family' itself."85 Unmarried mothers were seen as unfit, and
expected to relinquish their children. One agency head decried the lack of
79. KUNZEL, supra note 36, at 128.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 128-29; SOLINGER, supra note 71, at 57 (noting that, in 1958, only nine percent of all
adoptions were of nonwhite babies).
82. KUNZEL, supra note 36, at 129.
83. David M. Smolin, Child Laundering as Exploitation: Applying Anti-Trafficking Norms to
IntercountryAdoption Under the Coming Hague Regime, 32 VT. L. REV. 1, 7 (2007) (citing FESSLER,
supra note 7). See also SOLINGER, supra note 71, at 166 ("[W]hite unmarried mothers were defined by
the state out of their motherhood.").
84. Smolin, supra note 83, at 7.
85. KUNZEL, supra note 36, at 130.
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"skills and techniques" to obtain relinquishments among his social worker staff,
and the "fearfulness in being aggressive in securing a release, as I feel, for the
best interests of the child, they should be in many instances." 86 Thus, the
expected outcome of an unwed pregnancy of a woman was placement for
adoption, and social workers and agency professionals felt duty-bound to
ensure that unmarried mothers relinquished their children for adoption.87
As social workers changed their attitudes about unmarried mothers placing
children for adoption, there was a concomitant growth in interest in adoption
after World War 11.88 The American eugenics movement tapered off, taking
with it notions of biological determinism that had deterred adoption. Adoptive
parents were offered an image of "transplanted flowers" that would thrive in
the new family, and not revert to the "bad blood" of the birth parents.8 The
importance of parenting-especially mothering-emerged with the post-war
baby boom. 90 Infertile couples wanted in on the baby boom, and with less
concern that behavior was biologically determined, adoption became an
appealing option.91 While maternity homes prior to the war worked to prepare
unwed mothers for single parenting, after the war the homes anticipated that the
girls would place their children for adoption by infertile couples.92 This was
different for African American unwed mothers, who were largely excluded
from maternity homes and expected to parent their children long after the
expectations that white unwed mothers would relinquish their children for
adoption.93 Thus, from the period following World War II until Roe v. Wade
ushered in legalized abortion, a legal solution for white minors' pregnancy was
adoption. 94 By placing a child for adoption, an unwed mother could redeem her
transgression and contribute to her own rehabilitation.95
While some African American teen and unwed mothers did place children
for adoption in this period, most did not:

86. SOLINGER, supra note 71, at 156. In response to the desire for "skills and techniques" in
separating mothers from their babies, social workers were trained to take an active role to steer the
young mother toward acceptance of adoption. Id. at 157. Social workers were trained to believe,
"[r]ealistically [the unwed mother] is in no position to make any kind of decision, to know what her
feelings are, to evaluate any plan." Id. at 158.
87. Id. at 156 (describing a speech delivered by Henrietta Gordon of the Child Welfare League,
declaring it the duty of social workers to "help the mother to see the facts" that adoption was the best
option for her baby).
88. FESSLER,supra note 7, at 183.
89. HERMAN, supra note 66, at 29.
90. ELAINE TYLER MAY, BARREN IN THE PROMISED LAND: CHILDLESS AMERICANS AND THE

PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 127-49 (1995) (discussing the post-war baby boom and social pressures favoring
motherhood).
91. Id. at 141.
92. SOLINGER, supra note 71, at 17 ("White illegitimate babies could be a resource for childless
couples who wanted to achieve a proper family."). See also id. at 24.
93. Id. at 6. There were, however, a few integrated homes and some maternity homes exclusively
for African American mothers. Id. at 65-68.
94. FESSLER, supra note 7, at 183.
95. SOLINGER,supra note 71, at 17. See also Smolin, supra note 83, at 7.
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For the most part, black families accepted the pregnancy and made a
place for the new mother and child. As one Chicago mother of a
single black teenager said at the time, "It would be immoral to place
the baby [for adoption]. That would be like throwing away your own
flesh and blood." 96
While African American teen mothers received considerable family
support, they received very little welfare assistance. Even when legally eligible
for such benefits, many states and localities sanctioned "informal welfare
practices that denied or harassed black unwed mothers." 97 In some localities
those informal practices became formal policy: in Illinois, for instance, the
Public Aid Commission mandated that African American mothers on welfare
must be warned that having another illegitimate child could lead to jail time.98
With Roe v. Wade, abortion became an additional option for unmarried
women's unintended pregnancies. 99 Adoption placement continued, but there
was a significant decline starting in the late 1970s. Whether the availability of
legal abortion caused that decline is a highly contested matter, since the
legalization of abortion did not occur in a vacuum. At the same time that
abortion became legal, stigma associated with unwed pregnancy and
illegitimate birth started to decline as well:
Social scientists may eventually understand fully why attitudes toward
sex and marriage changed so profoundly. Whatever the mechanisms,
in less than a decade a shameful condition was transformed into a
personal choice. The rise of the women's movement, the sexual
revolution, the greater availability of abortion (which made out-ofwedlock childbearing truly a choice), and the increasing fragility of
marriage all no doubt contributed to the astonishing shift in the social
meaning of illegitimacy.oo
By the end of the Roe v. Wade decade, ninety percent of unmarried
mothers were choosing to parent their children rather than place them for
adoption.o'0
By the late 1980s, ninety-seven to ninety-nine percent of
unmarried mothers were choosing to parent their children.102 Given the
96. SOLINGER,supra note 71, at 6.
97. Id. at 5 1.
98. Id.
99. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
100. LUKER, supra note 18, at 97. Given the social stigma and expense of abortion, childbearing
may not realistically be "truly a choice," but the availability of legal abortion has changed perceptions
such that many believe an unmarried woman who gives birth has done so by choice.
101. Id. at 162.
102. Id.
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availability of legal abortion, "choosing to continue a pregnancy means
choosing to raise a child. Today the decision to keep a child is one that tends to
03
be made before the baby is born."'
With this changing landscape, fewer pregnant minors are relinquishing
parental rights and consenting to adoption. One scholar describes as most
common the view of adoption expressed by this 16-year-old mother:
Sure I thought about it, but I never could do it. I know a lot of people
could do a better job than me of being a mother and they can't get
pregnant, but that's not my fault. I'm not going to go through nine
months and then give someone else the benefit.' 04
With the decrease in stigma associated with out-of-wedlock birth, minor
mothers feel less pressure to relinquish parental rights. Placing a child for
adoption appears to them to be privileging material gain over the familial love
that a poor and young mother might feel is the only thing she can supply.105
This reluctance to place a child for adoption can been seen in a positive light:
"These young mothers express a commitment to moral values over material
advancement, a passionate attachment to children, and a willingness to try to
sustain a family (albeit a nontraditional one) whatever the social and financial
06
cost."'
While the increase in adoption placement after World War II coincided
with the increase in adoption demand, the opposite has occurred in recent
times. With delayed childbearing and increased infertility, 0 7 the demand for
adoption has increased while the supply of children has decreased.ios In this
environment, some adoption professionals are returning to the potentially
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 164.
Id.

107. WILLIAM D. MOSHER & WILLIAM F. PRATT, NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS., FECUNDITY,
INFERTILITY, AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES (1982) (noting that, between 1965

and 1982, infertility rates doubled for the portion of the population aged twenty to twenty-four).
108. In 2002, 560,000 women had taken some steps to adopt. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, ADOPTION EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN AND MEN AND DEMAND FOR CHILDREN TO ADOPT
BY WOMEN 18-44 YEARS OF AGE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2002, VITAL AND HEALTH STATS., Ser. 23,
No. 27, Fig. 2 (2008). In that same year, "the domestic supply of infants relinquished at birth or within
the first month of life and available to be adopted had become virtually nonexistent." Id. at 16. In
particular, the number of white infants available for adoption is far lower than the demand for such
infants. Barbara Fedders, Race and Market Values in Domestic Infant Adoption, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1687,
1687 (2010). The far greater demand for white infants allows private adoption agencies to charge higher
fees for placement of white infants. Id. at 1688. In surveying online marketing materials from adoption
agencies, Fedders discovered that "approximately eighteen percent charge higher fees for the adoption
of white infants than black infants. One adoption expert estimates that up to one-half of all agencies
employ race-based pricing." Id. at 1697-98. See also Michele Goodwin, The Free-Market Approach to
Adoption: The Value of a Baby, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 61, 65-66 (2006). Perversely, this market
reality may insulate mothers of African-American or bi-racial/African American infants from potentially
coercive tactics used to ensure relinquishment.
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coercive "skills and techniques" of the pastl 09 to encourage teen mothers to
relinquish their infants." 0 The National Council for Adoption (NCFA)
spearheaded legislation to create and fund the Infant Adoption Awareness
Program, which seeks to encourage adoption by offering free training to those
who might come into contact with pregnant teens at health clinics.'' 1 The
NCFA also offers the training to school nurses, abstinence program personnel,
and crisis pregnancy center counselors to encourage women & girls to consider
adoption placement.ll2 Although the law requires counseling to be
nondirective, there is considerable evidence in the training materials that the
counselor is expected to direct the girl toward adoption." 3
One method suggested in the training materials is that a girl resistant to
adoption is self-deceived, selfish, and behaving "inhumanely."1 4 Consider this
statement from the training materials:
Of course, if others are living inhumanely, they will not benefit from
what we offer until they change their hearts-until they give up their
self-deceptions. At the least, our humane obligation is to be relentless
in showing those seeking help how to create and maintain a humane
way of being in the midst of their seemingly overwhelming
circumstance.

So before answering these kinds of questions, we must also be living
in the principles and assumptions that guide our adoption philosophy.
For example, this curriculum invites adoption counselors, unmarried
109. See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
110. I describe the tactics as potentially coercive, though there is no case law considering these
particular tactics. Adoption consent must be voluntary to be valid, and coercion can render consent
involuntary. However, once a mother consents to adoption, the burden is on her to establish that the
consent was involuntary. Courts are not usually receptive to these claims. See Susan Stefan, Silencing
the Different Voice: Competence, Feminist Theory and Law, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 763, 804-08 (1993).
Stefan argues that coercion doctrine is unable "to provide an adequate remedy for women's injuries" in
the adoption context, ignoring the reality of women's lives. Id. at 806. "[C]ourts specifically refuse to
consider either the individual or cumulative effects of 'parental threats, pressure by the surrendering
mother's family, advice by the surrendering parent's physician and mother, emotional distress or
depression' as sufficient to constitute 'the 'kind of force' which would sustain a finding of duress."' Id.
at 806.
I11. See Children's Health Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-3 10, § 1201, 114 Stat. 1101 (2000). See
also Cynthia Dailard, Out of Compliance? Implementing the Intint Adoption Awareness Act, 7
GUTTMACHER

REP.

ON

PUB.

POL'Y

(2004),

available

at

http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/07/3/gr070310.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (noting that the
NCFA "takes credit for having played a key role in developing the legislation and shares the
conservative views of the bill's sponsors").
112. INFANT ADOPTION TRAINING INITIATIVE, http://www.infantadopt.org.
113. See ADOPTION PRACTICES IN THE HUMANE WORLD, NAT'L COUNCIL FOR ADOPTION ] (2005),

http://ncfaeducation.org/BirthparentCounseling/pdf/AdoptionPracticesInTheHumaneWorld.pdf.
at2.
114. Id.
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young women who are pregnant or have borne a child out of wedlock,
biological fathers not married to the woman, parents of the young
woman, and potential adoptive parents to consider the best interests of
the infant as paramount. This principle stands in contrast to granting
every person connected to the infant equal claim on the child. We are
pursuing adoption as a process that provides parents for a child who
needs them. It is meeting that need in the best possible way for the
child that invites us to take the adoption option seriously."15
The nondirective adoption counseling starts from the proposition that birth
mothers must "change their hearts" and recognize that they have no better
claim to the child than any other person-any other attitude is self-deceptive
and self-centered.l16 This is a shocking statement, given the way we ordinarily
frame parenthood and parental rights. Indeed, if the decision of who was the
rightful parent of the child rested solely on "best interests of the child," any
number of biological parents would lose their children to "better" parents-and
in a best interest of the child analysis, that "better" parent often means one who
is wealthier, older, and more stable. 17 Of course, it is offensive to equate the
"best interests of the child" with the wealth of the parenting families. But the
reality in adoption is that adoptive parents are usually financially far better
positioned than birth families.118
What does the training material suggest to put these ideas in practice?
Recall the statement illustrative of why so many teens are resistant to adoption:
Sure I thought about it, but I never could do it. I know a lot of people
could do a better job than me of being a mother and they can't get
pregnant, but that's not my fault. I'm not going to go through nine
months and then give someone else the benefit."19
The training materials suggest that the counselor respond as follows:

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Motherhood, 34 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 683 (2001). Professor Appell argues for the importance of biology in the legal construction of
parenthood. Critics of that basis for parental authority, she says, challenge "the integrity of those
families who do not easily fit dominant norms of family." Id. at 686. Supplanting biology with a broad
"best interest of the child" standard for parenthood ignores "the self-referential nature of assigning value
to families who resemble one's own family." Id. at 685. The position of the NCFA training materials
harks back to the 1940s and 1950s when adoption professionals refused to recognize mother-child dyads
as family. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
118. See Perry, supra note 1, at 101 (noting the financial disparity in adoption such that adoption is
often the transfer of a child from a less advantaged woman to a more advantaged one, especially in
transracial and international adoption).
119. LUKER, supra note 18, at 163. See also NAT'L COUNCIL FOR ADOPTION, supra note 113, at 9.
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This statement can be declared from a self-centered or other-centered
perspective. A variety of starting points are possible here, and must fit
the counselor's own sense of how to discuss realistic possibilities ....
Counselor: "It sounds as if that is a statement where you are
acknowledging the value of this baby-that the child means something
to you. Is that right?"
If the young woman acknowledges her meaning is that she would have
become attached to the child, you could ask, "When you first made the
decision to carry the child, do you sense you did it for the child or for
you?" [This is, of course a question that can be answered in four ways:
I did it for the child; I did it for me; I did it for both; I don't know (or
none of the above).]
A humane decision will always include being for the other, and being
for the other in a humane way will always reveal that you are
simultaneously "for" yourself.120
And in a pamphlet entitled, What Do I Say to a Client Who Says. .
counselors are told to answer the statement, "I could never give my baby
away," by encouraging adoption: "Adoption can be a courageous and unselfish
decision because you are putting the child above yourself."' 2 1 A video of a birth
mother discussing her decision to put the baby up for adoption illustrates how
the technique is employed.122 She describes telling her counselor emphatically
that she was not at all interested in adoption placement because she felt like it
would be a selfish choice.123 But it seems her "nondirective" counselor
encouraged the adoption choice, because she found herself working through an
"adoption workbook" and eventually realizing that adoption would be the best
choice to give her child the best life.124 It is hard to square this with the
"nondirective" approach to counseling touted by the training materials.
It is against this backdrop of history, social practice, and ideology about
teen pregnancy, unwed pregnancy, teen parenting, and attitudes toward
adoption that a pregnant minor is asked to make a decision about adoption
placement. Thus, it is instructive to consider how minors' decision making
differs from the decision making of adults, how the law has traditionally

120. NAT'L COUNCIL FOR ADOPTION, supra note 13, at 9-10.
121. WHAT Do I SAY TO A CLIENT WHO SAYS...?, NAT'L COUNCIL FOR ADOPTION I (2005),

http://ncfaeducation.org/BirthparentCounseling/pdf/whatDolSay.pdf.
122. Video
of
Birthparent,
NAT'L
COUNCIL
FOR
http://ncfaeducation.org/BirthparentCounseling/Insights.htm.
123. Id.
124. Id.

ADOPTION,

available

at
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viewed the decisions of minors, and how the law treats the decisions of minors
in abortion and adoption.
II. MINORS'

DECISIONMAKING

Lisa, 17, became pregnant at 15 and kept herpregnancy so secret that her
mother didn't even know when she went into hospital to have her daughter,
Summer Leigh. . . . "I thought I'd just go to hospital and give the baby up for
adoption. It was only when Igot to the hospital that I found out you can't until
you're 18 [in England].... I didn't want to give her away. I just didn't want
my mum to find out. It was a goodjob she found out. I would have regretted
it. "l25

A. Adolescent Development and Decisionmaking

Studies of adolescent development and decision making abilities almost
always start with Jean Piaget's 1958 book, The Growth of Logical Thinking
From Childhood to Adolescence.126 Piaget posited four stages of development

for children: the sensorimotor stage (birth to age 2), the preoperational stage
(ages 2 to 7), the concrete operational stage (ages 7 to 11), and the formal
operational stage (age 11 to adult).127 It is only in this final stage, Piaget
concluded, that adolescents acquire logical reasoning and abstract thinking.128
In addition, an adolescent in the formal operational stage "becomes capable of
introspection and is able to think about his or her own thoughts and feelings as
if they were objects."l 29 By age fifteen, according to Piaget, children become
capable of reasoning like adults: 130 "Both adults and adolescents with formal
operations reason using the same logical processes."l31
More recent studies question Piaget's stages of development, and note
significant differences in the way adults and adolescents think that are not
recognized in the age-based stages-of-development approach of Piaget.132
125. SUZIE HAYMAN & HELEN ELLIOTT, IT HAPPENED TO ME: TEENAGE PREGNANCY 18-19
(2002). Lisa's story is set in England, which differs substantially from the U.S. in its policies regarding
minors' ability to relinquish a child for adoption.
126. See, e.g., Daniel P. Keating, Cognitive and Brain Development, in HANDBOOK OF
ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY 45 (Richard M. Lerner & Laurence D. Steinberg eds., 2004).
127. See BARRY J. WADSWORTH, PIAGET'S THEORY OF COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE
DEVELOPMENT 26 (5th ed. 2004).
128. Id. at 111.
129. Id. at 112.
130. Id at 111.
131. Id. This is not to say that Piaget did not recognize differences in adolescent thought; he
attributed some of the differences to adolescents' "disquieting megalomania and conscious
egocentricity." Id. at 131 (citing JEAN PIAGET, SIX PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES 66 (1967)).
132. See, e.g., ROBERT S. SIEGLER, EMERGING MINDS: THE PROCESS OF CHANGE IN CHILDREN'S
THINKING 11 (1996) ("Unfortunately, [age-based stages-of-development models] have proved to be
inconsistent with a great deal of data.").
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Advances in brain imaging have allowed scientists to identify physical
differences in the brains of adults and adolescents, revealing that a person's
brain does not finish growing until early adulthood. "The human brain does not
settle into its mature, adult form until after the adolescent years have passed
and a person has entered young adulthood."' 3 3 The biological immaturity of
the adolescent brain is especially acute in the prefrontal cortex, which plays a
critical role in the higher functions of the brain, which are called the executive
or "CEO" functions:1 34
When it comes to "response inhibition, emotional regulation, planning
and organization," the so-called executive functions, the most
important components of the brain are the frontal lobes. In particular,
"the neocortex at the top of the brain[] mediate[s] 'more complex'
information-processing functions such as perception, thinking, and
reasoning," and the prefrontal cortex is associated with a variety of
cognitive abilities, including decisionmaking, risk assessment, ability
to judge future consequences, evaluating reward and punishment,
behavioral inhibition, impulse control, deception, responses to positive
and negative feedback, and making moral judgments.135
The prefrontal cortex is one of the last areas of the brain to mature.136
"Because they are at a more primitive developmental stage, adolescents lack
37
judgment . . . and cannot understand the consequences of their actions."
Other areas of the adolescent brain are also less developed than in the adult
brain. The cerebellum continues to change through adolescence, and plays a
significant role in "[a]nything we can think of as higher thought, mathematics,
music, philosophy, decision making, [and] social skill."' 38 The immaturity of
the adolescent brain produces judgments, thought patterns, and emotions that
are different from adults.139 Adolescents are more likely to focus on short-term

133. Brief for American Psychological Association & Missouri Psychological Association et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 9, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633)
[hereinafter Brief of APA].
134. Id. at 9-10 (citing ELKHONON GOLDBERG, THE EXECUTIVE BRAIN: FRONTAL LOBES AND THE
CIVILIZED MIND 23 (2001)).

135. Brief for American Medical Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 13-14,
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633) [hereinafter Brief of AMA] (citations omitted)
(quoting DANIEL J. SIEGEL, THE DEVELOPING MIND: TOWARD A NEUROBIOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL
EXPERIENCE 10 (1999); Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence fbr Post-Adolescent Brain
Maturation in Frontal and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 859, 860 (1999)).
136. Brief of AMA, supra note 135, at I1.
137. Katherine Hunt Federle & Paul Skendelas, Thinking Like a Child: Legal Implications of
Recent Developments in Brain Research fbr Juvenile Offenders, in LAW, MIND & BRAIN 199, 199
(Michael Freeman & Oliver Goodenough eds., 2009).
138. Id. at 202 (citing Interview with Jay Giedd, FRONTLINE (2002) http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ teenbrain/interviews/giedd.htmi).
139. Briefof AMA, supra note 135, at 5.
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consequences rather than future consequences,140 more likely to discount the
perspectives of others,141 and less likely to consider all available alternatives.142
Emotional volatility is a hallmark of adolescence, and has an effect on the
cognitive ability and decision making of teens:
The interplay among stress, emotion, and cognition in teenagers is
particularly complex-and different from adults. Stress affects
cognitive abilities, including the ability to weigh costs and benefits and
to override impulses with rational thought. But adolescents are more
susceptible to stress from daily events than adults, which translates
into a further distortion of the already skewed cost-benefit analysis.
Emotion, like stress, also plays an important role in cognition,
influencing decision making and risk-taking behavior. Because of both
greater stress and more drastic hormonal fluctuations, adolescents are
more emotionally volatile than adults-or children, for that matter.
They tend to experience emotional states that are more extreme and
more variable than those experienced by adults.143
In assessing information with high emotive content, adolescent brains react
differently from adult brains, relying more on the amygdala, the portion of the
brain dedicated to emotion, than the prefrontal cortex, which is dedicated to the
executive functions:
One of the implications of this work is that the brain is responding
differently to the outside world in teenagers compared to adults. And
in particular, with emotional information, the teenager's brain may be
responding with more of a gut reaction than an executive or more
thinking kind of response. And if that's the case, then one of the things
that you expect is that you'll have more of an impulsive behavioral
response, instead of a necessarily thoughtful or measured kind of
144
response.

140. Id. (citing Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts,
19 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 221, 231 (1995)).
141. Brief of APA, supra note 133, at 7 (citing Elizabeth Caufliman & Laurance Steinberg,
(1m)maturity and Judgment in Adolescence: Why Adolescents May be Less Culpable Than Adults, 18
BEHAV. SC. & L. 741, 757 (2000)).

142. Id. at 9.
143. Brief of AMA, supra note 135, at 8.
144. Interview
with
Deborah
Yurgelun-Todd,
FRONTLINE,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ teenbrain/interviews/todd.html.

(2002),
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Thus, it would be "unfair to expect [teens] to have adult levels of
organizational skills or decision making before their brain is finished being
built."' 45
Even before this scientific evidence was available to judges, the law
recognized the impaired decisionmaking abilities of minors. Of course, the law
is not completely consistent on this point 46-preventing capital punishment for
minors, while allowing minors to be tried criminally as adults; insisting on
parental involvement in minors' decisions about abortion, while allowing
pregnant minors to voluntarily relinquish parental rights. There are even
inconsistencies that cross these dyads, like those who applaud lesser culpability
for young offenders while decrying restrictions on minor girls' ability to
consent to abortion.147 The basic proposition of law, however, is that underage
persons cannot consent to a wide range of activities.
B. The Law
"Children are constitutionally different from adults."l48 The law has long
recognized that legal rights and liabilities of minors are different from adults.
For example, minors are not able to enter into binding contracts;149 vote in
elections;150 buy tobacco' 5 ' or alcohol;152 get a tattoo;153 marry without parental
consent;154 consent to sex in some states; or consent to 56or refuse l57 medical
145. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, ADOLESCENCE, BRAIN DEVELOPMENT AND LEGAL
CULPABILITY (2004).
146. Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive and Consistent Vision
of Children and Their Status under Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 275, 277 (2006); Rhonda
Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1267
(2000); Katherine Hunt Federle, On the Road to Reconceiving Rights for Children: A Postfeminist
Analysis of the Capacity Principle,42 DEPAUL L. REV. 983, 1021 (1993).
147. J. Shoshanna Ehrlich tries to resolve this conundrum, arguing that minor girls should be
allowed to consent to abortion without parental involvement, but that young offenders are deserving of
different treatment from adults because of their minority. Shifting Boundaries: Abortion, Criminal
Culpabilityand the Indeterminate Legal Status of Adolescents, 18 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 77, 116 (2003).
Ehrlich argues that adolescents have sufficient cognition to make the abortion decision, since it is
quintessentially a medical decision, while issues of criminal culpability include psychosocial
considerations irrelevant in the abortion decision. Id. at 105-08.
148. Miller v. Alabama, 132 U.S. 2455, 2458 (2012).
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 (1981).
150. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
151. Joni Hersch, Teen Smoking Behavior and the Regulatory Environment, 47 DUKE L. J. 1143,
1144 (1998) ("All states currently forbid the sale of tobacco products to minors under age eighteen.").
152. No one below the age of 21 can purchase alcohol. See National Minimum Drinking Age Act,
23 U.S.C. § 158 (2000).
153. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 653 (West 2012) (making it a misdemeanor to tattoo or offer a
tattoo to a person under age eighteen).
I 54. Pamela E. Beatse, Marital Rights for Teens: Judicial Intervention that Properly Balances
Privacy and Protection, II J.L FAM. STUD. 577, 580 n.18 (2009) (collecting state statutes requiring
parental consent to at least some minors' marriages).
155. Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV. 387,
403-04 (1984) (noting that the statutory age of consent in some states extended as high as age twentyone).
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procedures, including abortion.s A minor in California cannot even use a
tanning salon.159 The Supreme Court has recognized that minors who commit
crimes lack the level of culpability of adults, making it unconstitutional to
punish them with death 60 or with life sentences without the possibility of
parole.161 As the Court has noted, the law's differential treatment of children is
justified by three reasons: "the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability
to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance
of the parental role in child rearing." 62
1. Vulnerability ofMinors
In any number of areas, the law treats minors differently because of their
vulnerability when interacting with adults. For example, the well-known
limitation on the enforceability of minors' contracts is often justified on the
basis of the vulnerability of minors in interacting with adults in matters
involving money and property.163 Over-reaching and fraud by adults might go
undetected by minors, thus they are protected from the consequences of their
decisions by being able to void their contracts.1'6 In addition, minors are
thought to be more suggestible than adults, and thus less capable of resisting
high-pressure sales tactics.165 This problem of suggestibility informs other
differential treatment of minors; the Supreme Court argued that one reason
minors should not be put to death, even for serious crimes, is their malleability
and susceptibility to peer pressure.166 The vulnerability of young girls in the
156. David M. Vukadinovich, Minors' Rights to Consent to Treatment: Navigating the Complexity
of State Laws, 37 J. HEALTH L. 667, 670 (2004) ("As recognized by Justice Cardozo, competent adults
have the right to consent to or refuse medical treatment. That same right does not extend to minors, who
generally are not considered mature enough to make informed healthcare decisions without the
involvement of an adult.").
157. Id. See also Martin T. Harvey, Adolescent Competency and the Refusal of Medical Treatment,
13 HEALTH MATRIX 297, 298-300 (2003) (describing the traditional view that minors and other
"incompetents" should not have the right to refuse medical treatment when death or disability would
result).
158. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
159. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22706(b)(3) (West 2012).
160. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561, 570-71 (2005).
161. Miller v. Alabama, 132 U.S. 2455 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 825 (2010).
162. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634.
163. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 9.18 (2012); WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 9:5 (1993). See also
Cheryl B. Preston and Brandon T. Crowther, Infancy Doctrine Inquiries, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 47,
50 (2012) ("The infancy doctrine protects [minors] from both 'crafty adults' and their own bad
judgment.") (citations omitted); Julie Cromer Young, From the Mouths of Babes: Protecting Child
Authors from Themselves, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 431 (2010) (claiming that infancy doctrine "protects the
minor from malevolent contractual predators who would take advantage of a naive child").
164. See Dodson v. Shrader, 824 S.W.2d 545, 547 (Tenn. 1992); Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal
Construction ofAdolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 553 (2000).
165. See Victoria Slade, The Infancy Defense in the Modern Contract Age: A Useful Vestige, 34
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 613, 627 (2011) (claiming that infancy doctrine prevents "unwitting children [from]
being subjected to manipulation by corporations").
166. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 616 (2005).
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face of seduction efforts of older men informs statutory rape laws.' 6 7
Limitations on police interrogation of minors are justified on the basis of the
increased suggestibility of minors.168
2. Immature Decisionmaking
"The State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action
and from their own immaturity," 69 because "during the formative years of
childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and
170
judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.",
One scholar argues that the law views minors the same way Saint Paul did, as
"impaired adults, unable to perceive and understand until transformation to
adulthood." 7' Restrictions on possession of alcohol and tobacco are obviously
justified on the basis of minors lacking the experience or perspective to avoid
deleterious choices.172 Restrictions on voting and jury service for minors rest
on the presumption that minors lack the necessary life experience to participate
in these decisionmaking activities in a meaningful way.1

167. Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors: Dejining a Role fbr Statutory
Rape, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 703, 704 (2000) (arguing that "minors, because of their inexperience, are
vulnerable to exploitation and coercion in their sexual interactions," and noting that "29.2% of babies
born to girls under age sixteen were fathered by men over age twenty-one, and the younger the girls, the
older the average age of the father").
168. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1967); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 598 (1948);
Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d 654, 657 (Mass. 1983) (holding that a parent or interested
adult must be present before a juvenile confession is valid); State v. Fincher, 305 S.E.2d 685, 692 (N.C.
1983) (holding that a juvenile defendant must be informed he had a right for a parent or guardian to be
present during interrogation); In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d 937, 940 (Vt. 1982) (holding that a juvenile cannot
waive rights against self-incrimination without the presence of an interested adult); see also Patrick M.
McMullen, Questioning the Questions: The Impermissibility of Police Deception in Interrogations of
Juveniles, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 971, 972 (2005) (exploring "the power of the police to deceive juvenile
suspects in criminal interrogations, and the effects such deception can have on impressionable and
immature children").
169. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637 (1979).
170. Id. at 635.
171. Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children 's Perspectives and the
Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. I1, 12 (1994).
172. The law even protects minors from advertising about these products. See Donald W. Garner &
Richard J. Whitney, Protecting Children From Joe Camel and His Friends: A New First Amendment
and Federal Preemption Analysis of Tobacco Billboard Regulation, 46 EMORY L.J. 479, 480, 484
(1997); Angela Turriciano, The FDA Sends Smoke Signals to Big Tobacco: Will the FDA SufeLr
Backlash, Will Alcohol Be Regulated Next, and Will the Health ofAmericans Prevail?, 25 PEPP. L. REV.
617, 624 (1998).
173. Scott, supra note 164, at 562 ("Like many other legal rights, the right to vote is withheld from
minors because of assumptions about developmental immaturity."). But see Vivian E. Hamilton,
Immature Citizens and the State, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1055, 1140-41 (arguing that minors should be
allowed to vote). When Representative Keith Ellison of Minnesota suggested that sixteen-year-olds be
allowed to vote, some responded that "teens that young are not informed enough to vote." Pete
Kasperowicz, Dem Rep. Ellison: Let 16-Year-Olds Vote, THE HILL (Jan. 17, 2012, 12:16 PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/204525-rep-ellison-let- 16-year-olds-vote.
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3. ParentalAuthority
"[T]he guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children justifies
limitations on the freedoms of minors."l74 Parental authority over children is a
concept that had existed long before the creation of the Republic.' 7 5 Parents
have the constitutional right "to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control." 76 The law allows and expects parents to teach, guide, and
inspire their children as they "grow into mature, socially responsible
citizens."' 77 That parental authority is not simply a matter of rights-it is
instrumental and good for children:
Parents' strong emotional attachment to their children and considerable
knowledge of their particular needs make parents the child-specific
experts most qualified to assess and pursue their children's best
interests in most circumstances. In contrast, the state's knowledge of
and commitment to any particular child is relatively thin. A scheme of
strong constitutional rights shields the parent expert from the intrusive
second-guessing of the less expert state.178
While parental authority is not absolute,179 it serves as an important
limitation on minors' autonomy. The origin of statutory rape laws, for example,
rested in the father's ownership of his daughter, as with laws relating to
parental consent for early marriage. so The justification for laws limiting a
minor's right to consent to or refuse medical treatment rests on this concept of
parental authority.' 8 '

174. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 637.
175. See I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *452; JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 348-49 (1698): SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 112

(1703).
176. Pierce v. Soc'y ofSisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
177. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 638 (observing that raising children is "beyond the competence of
impersonal political institutions").
178. Emily Buss, "Parental"Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 647 (2002). See also Bellotti, 443 U.S. at
638; Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption
that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for
making life's difficult decisions.").
179. See Gonzales v. Reno (The Elian Gonzales Case), 212 F.3d 1338, 1352 n.20 (1Ith Cir. 2000)
("Especially because the best interests of a child and the best interests of even a loving parent can clash,
parental authority over children-even where the parent is not generally 'unfit'-is not without limits in
this country.").
180. See Yehiel S. Kaplan, A Father's Consent to the Marriage of His Minor Daughter: Feminism
and Multiculturalism in Jewish Law, 18 S. CAL. REV. L. & Soc. JUST. 393 (2009) (discussing Jewish
patriarchal structures contributing to understandings of early marriage).
181. Alicia Ouellette, Shaping Parental Authority over Children's Bodies, 85 IND. L.J. 955, 956-57
(2010) (noting that parental authority has allowed parents to "westernize the eyes of their adoptive Asian
children, to modify the facial features of children with Down Syndrome, to inject human growth
hormone (HGH) into healthy children, to enlarge the breasts of or suck the fat from teenagers, to
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Of course, these three justifications for limitations on minors-their
vulnerability, their immaturity in decision making, and their parents'
authority-are interrelated. We grant parents authority over children because
of children's vulnerability, and their immature decision making often creates
that vulnerability. These justifications are easily seen in the regulation of
minors' abortion decisionmaking, yet are entirely absent in the way most states
regulate minors' decisionmaking in the context of relinquishment of parental
rights and consent to adoption placement.
III. REGULATION OF MINORS' ABORTION AND ADOPTION DECISIONMAKING
Well, first, I was happy. I was like, "Oh my god, I have a little baby
growing inside of me." I was happy, and then ... I was thinking how my
family would react .. . and that's when I was like, "Nope, I can't have the
baby.

,182

A. Abortion and Minors
In 1976, the Supreme Court extended to at least some minors the privacy
protection to make decisions about abortion, acknowledged for adults a few
The Court held that a statutory scheme that gave parents an
years earlier.
absolute veto over a minor's decision to terminate her pregnancy was
unconstitutional, while "signaling that the Court might uphold a less intrusive
law." 84 The court revisited the issue four years later in Bellotti v. Baird,'
holding that a minor's ability to obtain an abortion could be limited in certain
respects. In particular, a state could prevent a minor from having an abortion
absent parental consent, so long as the state provided a judicial bypass
exception.186 In so doing, the Court "simultaneously recognized and curtailed
the liberty and interest of young women in their own bodies."1 87 Since that
ruling, 43 states have passed statutes requiring parental notification or consent
prior to a minor's abortion, though in 5 of those states the parental involvement
laws are temporarily or permanently enjoined.' 88 22 states require that at least
attenuate the growth and remove the reproductive organs of a child with disabilities, and to remove bone
marrow from a nine-year-old girl for use by a brother who sexually abused her.").
182. EHRLICH, supra note 5, at 84 (quoting an interview with Stephanie Paul, age 17).
183. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). The Court noted, however, that
"[O]ur holding ... does not suggest that every minor, regardless of age or maturity, may give effective
consent for termination of her pregnancy." Id. at 75.
184. EHRLICH,supra note 5, at 43.
185. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
186. Id. See also EHRLICH, supra note 5, at 15.
187. EHRLICH,supra note 5, at 33.
188. GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: AN OVERVIEW OF MINORS' CONSENT LAW

(2013) (stating that parental involvement is enjoined in California, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey, and
New Mexico).
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one parent consent to a minor's abortion,189 while 11 states require prior
notification of at least one parent.190 5 states require both notification of and
consent from a parent prior to a minor's abortion.191
In all states with parent involvement laws, statutes also provide for judicial
bypass as required by the Constitution.' 92 The judicial bypass provision is
designed to preserve decisional privacy for minors and to prevent parental
consent requirements from amounting to an absolute veto.' 93 Some statutes
provide specific direction to the court on factors to consider in allowing a
minor to have an abortion without parental notification or consent. For
example, Arizona law requires the court to allow the abortion if it determines
that the pregnant minor is mature and capable of giving informed consent, or
that the abortion without parental notice or consent would be in her best
interests. 194 In Louisiana, a minor seeking judicial bypass may be required to
attend an evaluation and counseling session with a mental health professional,
designed to produce "trustworthy and reliable expert opinion concerning the
minor's sufficiency of knowledge, insight, judgment, and maturity." 95
B. Adoption and Minors
In all U.S. jurisdictions, a minor's status as a minor does not impair her
consent to relinquish her parental rights, so long as statutory requirements are
met. In some jurisdictions, adoption statutes say explicitly that a minor parent
can relinquish parental rights and consent to adoption.196 Even where the
189. Id. at 2 (describing laws in Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin).
190. Id. (describing laws in Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Maryland,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, South Dakota, and West Virginia).
191. Id. (describing laws in Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming).
192. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979). See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-21-3(e) (LexisNexis
2011); ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.020(a)(2)-(3) (2011); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 36-2152(B) (LexisNexis 2011);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.01114(4) (West 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-114 (2010); IND. CODE ANN. §
16-34-2-4(b) (LexisNexis 2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 135L.3(3) (West 2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
311.732(3) (West 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.5(B) (2011).
193. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642; see also EHRLICH,supra note 5, at 46-47.

194. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2152(B) (LexisNexis 2011). See also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-609A(2)
(2010) (allowing judicial bypass for maturity or best interests reasons); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-4
(LexisNexis 2011) (same); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.732(3) (West 2010) (allowing that courts shall
hear evidence relating to "emotional development, maturity, intellect, and understanding of the minor;
the nature, possible consequences, and alternatives to the abortion; and any other evidence that the court
may find useful"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.5(B) (2011).
195. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §40:1299.35.5(B) (2011).
196. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.082 (West 2010) (holding that a minor parent has the power to
consent to adoption, and may not revoke that consent upon reaching the age of majority); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 578-2(e) (LexisNexis 2010) ("The minority of a child's parent shall not be a bar to the
right of such parent to execute a valid and binding consent to the adoption of such child."); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 93-15-103(2) (2003) ("The rights of a parent ... may be relinquished [by signed affidavit] ...
regardless of the age of the parent"); In re Adoption of D.N.T., 843 So. 2d 690, 706-07 (Miss. 2003)
(holding that a minor mother can consent to adoption pursuant to the statute, which overrides a rule of
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statutes are silent, however, courts generally hold that the minor mother can
consent. In Nelson v. Gibson,'97 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the
seventeen-year-old mother, who had since married the father of the child and
was then seeking to prevent the adoption, had consented under a silent statute:
The statute as then worded provided for the consent of the unwed
mother without any limitation upon the giving of that consent by
reason of her minority. In the same section it is specifically provided
that no child over the age of 14 years shall be adopted without his
consent. In other words, the Legislature was not unmindful of age
qualifications, but chose to make none as to the illegitimate mother.
The age of legal capacity is wholly a matter of legislative regulation,
and the disabilities of infancy may be removed for certain purposes at
an earlier age than for others. It follows that the mother, though a
minor-as the law then existed-had the capacity to consent to the
adoption of her child. 98
In a majority of U.S. jurisdictions, a minor's decision to relinquish a child
for adoption is not only valid, but is regulated exactly the same as an adult's
decision. 99 In only fifteen states are there different or additional requirements
for a minor's decision to place a child for adoption. 200 In four states, a minor
must be provided independent legal counsel. 20 1 In another four states, a court
must appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor parent.202 In five states, a
minor's parent must consent to the relinquishment.203
1. Independent Legal Counsel
Independent legal counsel for a prospective birth mother is not universally
required in the United States. In four states, however, when the prospective
birth mother is a minor she is required to have independent legal counsel,

procedure requiring service of process in civil case to be served on the parent of that minor mother);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.103(a)(1) (West 2010) (holding that an affidavit of voluntary
relinquishment of parental rights may be signed "by the parent, whether or not a minor, whose parental
rights are to be relinquished"); .
197. 50 N.W.2d 278 (Minn. 1951).
198. Id. at 283 (citations omitted).
199. This article discusses those few states that have separate treatment for minor mothers. See
in/ra notes 204-243 and accompanying text. In all other states, there are no statutes providing for
different treatment of minors.
200. See infra discussion accompanying notes 204-243.
201. Kansas, Maryland, Montana, and Vermont. See infra notes 204-220 and accompanying text.
202. Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, and Kentucky. See in/ra notes 221-235 and accompanying
text.
203. The states are Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. See inf;a
notes 236-43243 and accompanying text.
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meaning that the attorney cannot also represent the adoptive parents or the
adoption agency facilitating the placement.
Prior to 1990, Kansas statutes addressed the minority of the placing parent
by simply stating that minority shall not invalidate a parent's consent.204 After a
study of the Family Law Advisory Committee of the Kansas Judicial Council,
several changes were proposed to protect minor parents.205 The committee
stated:
Minors are afforded legal protection in regard to other decisions and it
appears to the committee that the decision to give up a child merits
attempts at protection as well. The proposed subsection would require
independent legal counsel for a minor and the presence of the minor's
attorney at the time the instrument is executed.206
Kansas statutes now provide that the minor parent must first have the
advice of independent legal counsel as to the consequences of the consent prior
to the execution of the consent affidavit.207 Counsel must also be present when
the affidavit is executed. 208 In Kansas, the prospective adoptive parents or the
child-placing agency are solely responsible for the expense of providing
independent counsel. 209
The statutory requirement of independent counsel does not mean that a
minor parent must be provided with counsel to represent her throughout the
adoption proceeding, however. In a case where a minor parent was afforded
counsel at the time of consent, then sought out the same attorney to represent
her in challenging her consent in court and was refused, the court held that it
was sufficient that counsel represent the minor parent "immediately prior to
and at the time consent is executed." 2 10
In Montana, a relinquishment executed by a minor parent "is not valid
unless the minor parent has been advised by an attorney who does not represent
the prospective adoptive parent" in a direct placement adoption.211 In 2006, the
Montana Supreme Court addressed whether this provision applied in a case

204. In re Adoption of N.A.P., 930 P.2d 609, 614, (Kan. Ct. App. 1997).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 614-15.
207. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2115 (2010).
208. Id. The Family Law Advisory Committee of the Kansas Judicial Council, in proposing this
requirement, spoke to the necessity of counsel's presence at the time the affidavit was executed: "The
proposal requires the minor's attorney to be present at the time of execution in light of the fact that
advice provided at an earlier time may diminish in value due to the intervening passage of time and birth
of the child." N.A.P., 930 P.2d at 615.
209. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2115 (2010).
210. N.A.P., 930 P.2d at 614. The court further stated, "It was not intended that the minor be
provided legal representation for the adoption proceeding to follow. If the legislature would have
intended full-blown legal representation for a minor, it would have said so." Id.
211. MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-2-405(2) (West 2011).
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where the birth mother misstated her age and all parties believed that the
mother was over eighteen at the time of the adoption.212 The court concluded
that the statute "exists to protect minor parents from making legally binding
direct parental placement adoptions without counsel's advice and
representation."213 Noting that the minor mother had difficulty understanding
the paperwork related to the adoption, that the prospective adoptive mother
called her once a day to encourage her to sign and promised that she could see
her child anytime she wanted, and that the minor mother did not know this
promise was not enforceable, the court concluded that this was precisely why
the statute existed-to protect minor mothers like this one. Therefore, the court
invalidated the mother's consent. 214
In adoption proceedings where a minor parent relinquishes parental rights
or consents to adoption, Maryland law requires the court to appoint an attorney
to represent the parent.215 Furthermore, consent of a minor parent is not valid
unless accompanied by an affidavit of appointed counsel stating that the minor
consents knowingly and voluntarily.216 The statute does not explicitly require
that counsel for minor birth parents be independent of the prospective adoptive
parents or child-placing agency. The statutes provide that an attorney may
represent more than one party to the adoption if the Maryland Lawyers' Rules
of Professional Conduct would allow that dual representation.217
Vermont notes that a parent who is a minor is competent to execute a
consent or relinquishment if the parent has had the advice of an attorney who
does not represent the adoptive parents or the agency to which the parent is
relinquishing the child.218 The attorney must be present when the consent is
executed. 2 19 The person before whom the consent or relinquishment is taken
must certify that a minor parent was advised by an independent attorney. 220
2. GuardianAd Litem
Four states-Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, and Kentucky-require a
court to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent a minor parent in an adoption
proceeding. A minor mother in Alabama can relinquish her parental rights, and
the fact of minority does not provide grounds for revocation of that consent. 221
However, the court must appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the interests
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
interest"
218.
219.
220.
221.

In re Adoption of A.L.O., 132 P.3d 543 (Mont. 2006).
Id. at 546.
Id.
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-307 (West 2013).
Id. § 5-339.
Id. § 5-307(c). The Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct contain a general "conflict of
provision. MD. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2013).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A § 2-405(c) (West 2012).
Id.
Id. § 2-405(d)(5).
ALA. CODE § 26-1OA-8(b) (LexisNexis 2012).
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of the minor parent.222 A minor over the age of thirteen can nominate the
guardian ad litem she wishes to represent her.223 A minor father must also have
a guardian ad litem appointed, unless the court finds that he has impliedly
consented to the adoption by his actions.224
Though the statute requires the appointment of a guardian ad litem to
represent the interests of the minor mother, it does not, apparently, require that
appointment to occur prior to the mother's consent to the adoption. In
Anderson v. Hetherington,225 the appellate court found that during the course of
the adoption hearing, "the [adoption] court discovered that the mother was a
minor at the time of giving birth, at the time of signing the consent, and at the
time of the hearing." 226 At that point, "[t]he court appointed a guardian ad
litem to protect the mother's interests and continued the hearing." 227 The
mother was not personally present at the hearing and appeared never to have
met with the guardian ad litem; thus, the belatedly appointed guardian ad litem
was the only representation of the mother's interests at the adoption hearing. 228
Nevertheless, the court found the mother's consent to be valid. The mother
filed a motion to reconsider, and after hearing additional testimony, the court
reaffirmed its prior decision and granted the petition for adoption.229 As the
reviewing court failed to even discuss the fact that the guardian ad litem was
appointed belatedly and was not required to consult with the mother prior to
representing her interests, the court appeared to accept the limited role of the
guardian ad litem in this context.
If a relinquishing parent is a minor, Arkansas requires that consent be
signed by a court-ordered guardian ad litem.230 The guardian ad litem is
appointed to appear on behalf of the minor parent for the purpose of executing
consent.231 In Connecticut, when a minor parent petitions for voluntary
termination of parental rights, the trial court shall appoint a guardian ad litem
for such parent.232 The statute further provides that the guardian ad litem must
be a licensed Connecticut attorney or an officer of a child placement agency
who is not the petitioner.233 The guardian ad litem is entitled to reasonable
compensation, and if the minor parent cannot afford to pay, the guardian ad

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. § 26-1OA-8(a).
Id.
Id § 26-1OA-8(c).
560 So. 2d 1078 (Ala. 1990).
Id. at 1079.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-208(c) (West 2010).
Id.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-708(a) (West 2011).
Id.
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litem will be paid from state funds.234 Kentucky also provides that a guardian
ad litem must be appointed for a minor parent. 235
3. ParentalConsent
In five states-Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire and
Rhode Island-parental consent or notification is a necessary prerequisite to a
minor's relinquishment of parental rights. Louisiana requires parental consent
of the minor parent in private adoptions, but not in agency adoption.236 In
private adoption, a minor parent surrendering a child for adoption must have a
parent or guardian join in the surrender unless the minor has been
237
emancipated.
The statute further provides that if the minor's parent refuses
consent, the court may authorize the surrender by the minor if it finds that 1)
the minor is sufficiently mature and well-informed to surrender, and 2) the
surrender is in the child's best interest.238
Michigan does not recognize an unemancipated minor parent's consent to
adoption as valid unless her parent, guardian, or guardian ad litem consents. 239
Though Minnesota has recognized since 1951 that a minor mother can consent
to adoption,240 it requires that the minor mother's parents or guardian also
consent. 24 New Hampshire statutes require that a birth mother to surrender
parental rights in adoption, but if she is under eighteen, the court may require
the assent of her parents or legal guardian as well.242 In Rhode Island, "no
minor parent may give a binding consent to any adoption petition or to any
termination of rights ... except with the consent of one of the parents,
guardian, or guardian ad litem of the minor parent." 243
IV.

ARE THE DECISIONS ABOUT ABORTION AND ADOPTION SIMILAR?

I have given a baby up for adoption, and I have had an abortion,and while
anecdotes are not evidence, I can assert that abortions may or may not cause
depression-itcertainly did not in me, apartfrom briefly mourning the path not
taken-but adoption? That is an entirely different matter. I don't doubt that
there are women who were fine after adoption, and there is emphatically
234. Id.

§ 45a-708(b)-(c).

235. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.500(2) (West 2010).
236. LA.CHILD.CODE ANN.arts. 1113(A), 1113(E), I122(B)(3)(West2011).
237. Id. art. 11 13(A).
238. Id. arts. 11 13(C), 1122(B)(3).
239. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.43(4) (West 2011).
240. Nelson v. Gibson, 50 N.W.2d 278 (Minn. 1951).
241. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.24(2) (West 2012). The statute requires that a minor also be offered
the opportunity to consult with an attorney, clergy member, or doctor, but does not render consent
invalid if the minor declines the offer. Id.
242.

N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.

§ 170-B:5(1)(a)

(West 2011).

243. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-7-10(b) (West 2012).
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nothing wrong with that or with them; but I want to point out that if we're
going to have a seemingly neverending discussion about the sorrow and
remorse caused by abortion, then it is about goddamn time that we hearfrom
birth mothers too.
Believe me when I say that of the two choices, it was adoption that nearly
destroyed me-and it never ends.244
The differential treatment of a minor's decision to have an abortion and a
minor's decision to relinquish parental rights and consent to adoption is
striking. Are the decisions so dissimilar as to justify this difference? Three
reasons are commonly given for why minors should not be making the decision
about abortion on their own: 1) health risks associated with all medical
procedures, including abortion, 2) emotional fallout after abortion, and 3) the
seriousness of the decision. The decision about relinquishment of parental
rights and consent to adoption seem to share these characteristics with the
abortion decision.
A. PhysicalHealth and Safety
1. Abortion
One frequent argument for parental notification in teen abortions is that
parents ought to know about medical procedures performed on their children,
given that all medical procedures involve some health risks. A parent informed
of a minor's abortion can help the minor evaluate the medical risks and can
provide aftercare with an awareness to watch for adverse consequences.2 45 One
can make the same argument about childbirth by minor children. The risk of
death and medical complications is greater with childbirth than with abortion,
and since childbirth is riskier for teens than for adults, abortion for teens is
significantly safer than childbirth for teens. 246 Indeed, in Roe v. Wade,247 the
Court noted the following about the risk of abortion versus the risk of
childbirth:
[Albortion in early pregnancy, that is, prior to the end of the first
trimester, although not without its risk, is now relatively safe.
Mortality rates for women undergoing early abortions, where the

244. Anonymous, Breaking the Silence: On Living Pro-Lifers' Choice for Women, SHAKESVILLE
BLOG (Mar. 17, 2009), http://www.shakesville.com/2009/03/breaking-silence-on-living-pro-lifers.html.
245. See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 5, at 5-6.
246. Willard Cates, Jr., Abortion for Teenagers, in ABORTION AND STERILIZATION: MEDICAL AND

SOCIAL ASPECTS 139, 147 (Jane E. Hodgson ed., 1981) (nothing that the mortality rate for teen
pregnancy is five times higher than the mortality rate for teen abortion).
247. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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procedure is legal, appear to be as low as or lower than the rates for
normal childbirth. Consequently, any interest of the State in protecting
the woman from an inherently hazardous procedure, except when it
would be equally dangerous for her to forgo it, has largely
disappeared. 248

More recent statistics support the Court's assessment of the low medical
risks associated with abortion, especially when compared to the risks associated
with continued pregnancy and childbirth. 249 Not only are mortality risks lower
for teen abortion, 250 the risk of serious complications is also lower for teens. 251
Abortion for teens does not pose long-term health risks, either-not for breast
cancer,252 future infertility, 253 low-weight babies in the future,254 or increased
risk of miscarriage in subsequent pregnancies after abortion.255

2. Pregnancy and Childbirth
Pregnancy poses health risks for adolescents at a higher rate than for
adults. 256 Teenage girls who are pregnant are less likely to get adequate
prenatal care, which could screen for medical problems for both mother and

248. Id. at 149.
249. Linda A. Bartlett et al., Risk Factorsfbr Legal Induced Abortion-Related Mortality in the
United States, 103 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 729, 729 (2004) ("During 1988-1997, the overall death
rate for women obtaining legal abortions was 0.7 per 100,000."); C.J. Berg et al., Pregnancy-Related
Mortality in the United States, 1998-2005, 116 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1302, 1302 (2010) (stating
that the aggregate pregnancy-related mortality ratio for 1997-2005 was 14.5 per 100,000 live births). But
see David C. Reardon et al., Deaths Associated with Abortion Compared to Childbirth-A Review of
New and Old Data and the Medical and Legal Implications, 20 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 279,
287 (2004) (arguing that the statistics fail to capture all the deaths attributable to abortion).
250. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 45, at 125 (noting that teenagers have lower death
rates from legal abortion than all other age groups); Herschel W. Lawson et al., Abortion Mortality,
United States. 1972 Through 1987, 171 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1365 (1994) (finding
women over thirty-nine years old have three times the risk of death during an abortion as teenagers).
251. Willard Cates, Jr. et al., The Risks Associated with Teenage Abortion, 309 NEW. ENG. J. MED.
621 (1983) (finding lower morbidity associated with teen abortions); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra
note 45, at 125 (noting that complications following abortion were lower for teens than adult women,
regardless of the gestational stage at which abortion is performed and regardless of the method used).
252. Michael J. Goldacre et al., Abortion and Breast Cancer: a Case-Control Record Linkage
Study, 55 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 336 (200 1) (finding that women with breast cancer
are less likely to have had an abortion than those in the control group); Maya Mahue-Giangreco et al.,
Induced Abortion, Miscarriage, and Breast Cancer Risk of Young Women, 12 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY
BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 209 (2003) (finding that induced abortion does not increase the breast

cancer risk of young women).
253. Peter 1. Frank et al., The EJfct of Induced Abortion on Subsequent Fertility, 100 BRITISH J.
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 575 (1993); B. Kaplan et al., Future Fertility Following Conservative
Management of Complete Abortion, I t HUM. REPROD. 92 (1996).
254. Janet R. Daling & Irvin Emanuel, Induced Abortion and Subsequent Outcome ofPregnancy in
a Series otAmerican Women, 297 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1241 (1977).
255. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 45, at 125.

256. Id. at 123.
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baby, and are more likely to have poor eating habits during pregnancy.257
Pregnant teens also have a higher risk of having pregnancy-induced
hypertension than pregnant adult women. 258 These health conditions also
predispose pregnant adolescents to premature birth and low-birth-weight
babies, and to higher rates of miscarriages and stillbirths. 259 Postpartum
depression may also be higher for adolescents than for adults. 260
B. Emotional Health and Wellbeing
1. Abortion

In H.L. v. Matheson,261 the Court justified parental notification by arguing
that "[t]he ... emotional[] and psychological consequences of an abortion are
serious and can be lasting; this is particularly so when the patient is
immature." 262 Some studies do, indeed, support the proposition that minors'
reactions after abortion differ from adults' reactions.263 For example, younger
257. Id. at 124; see also Daniel Bluestein & M. Elizabeth Starling, Helping Pregnant Teenagers,
161 W.J. MED. 140, 140 (1994) (noting that pregnant teens delay health care because it is unavailable,
inaccessible, and unaffordable, and noting poor nutrition as a factor in negative pregnancy outcomes in
adolescents).
258. Robert Miller, Preventing Adolescent Pregnancy and Associated Risks, 41 CAN. FAM.
PHYSICIAN 1525, 1528 (1995) (finding that pregnant adolescents experience a whole litany of
complications, including pregnancy-induced hypertension, at rates higher than older women).
259. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 45, at 123-25; see also Catherine Stevens-Simon &
Elizabeth R. McAnamey, Adolescent Pregnancy, in HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH RISK
BEHAVIOR 314, 314 (Ralph J. DiClemente et al. eds., 1995). But see Debbie A. Lawlor & Mary Shaw,
Too Much Too Young? Teenage Pregnancy Is Not a Public Health Problem, 31 INT'L. J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY. 552, 552, 553 nn.13-15, 554 n.16 (2002) (citing studies that found that adverse
pregnancy outcomes for teens were attributable to socio-economic factors and smoking, not age).
260. See Robyn Birkeland et al., Adolescent Motherhood and Postpartum Depression, 34 J.
CLINICAL CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHOL. 292 (2005) (noting that in a previous study, "adolescent
mothers were twice as likely as adult mothers to be depressed"); Zachary N. Stowe & Charles B.
Nemeroff, Women at Risk for Postpartum-Onset Major Depression, 173 AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 639, 640 (1996).
261. 450 U.S. 398(1981).
262. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 411 n.20 ("The emotional and psychological effects of the pregnancy
and abortion experience are markedly more severe in girls under 18 than in adults.") (citing Judith S.
Wallerstein et al., Psychosocial Sequelae of Therapeutic Abortion in Young Unmarried Women, 27
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 828 (1972)); Hrair M. Babikian & Adila Goldman, A Study in Teen-Age
Pregnancy, 128 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 755 (1971)).
263. See Wanda Franz & David Reardon, Differential Impact of Abortion on Adolescents and
Adults, 27 ADOLESCENCE 161, 163 (1992) (citing Sherry L. Hatcher, Understanding Adolescent
Pregnancy and Abortion, 3 PRIMARY CARE 407, 410 (1976)); Brenda Major & Catherine Cozzarelli,
Psychosocial Predictors of Adjustment to Abortion, 48 J. SOC. ISSUES 121, 137-38 (1992) (suggesting
that the ability to effectively cope with abortion is linked with self-efficacy, which may be undermined
"by younger age and correspondingly fewer resources"); Sharon D. White & Richard R. DeBlassie,
Adolescent Sexual Behavior, 27 ADOLESCENCE 183, 183 (1992) (explaining that abortion can result in
"medical and psychological problems, especially for the immature teenager"); cf Anne C. Speckhard &
Vincent M. Rue, PostabortionSyndrome: An Emerging Public Health Concern, 48 J. SOC. ISSUES 95,
97 (1992). But see Robin C. Alter, Abortion Outcome as a Function ofSex-Role Identification, 8 PSYCH.
WOMEN Q. 211, 225 (1984) (finding that age is not a significant predictor of post-abortion anxiety,
depression or hostility); Lorry Cohen & Susan Roth, Coping with Abortion, 10 J. HUMAN STRESS 140,
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women are more likely to feel guilt instead of relief after an abortion,264 and
these increased feelings of guilt and depression for younger women persisted
six months post-abortion.265 Two to three months after abortion, younger
women were more likely to experience shame, guilt, fear of disapproval, regret,
anxiety, depression, doubt, and anger than older women.266 Another study, of
women selected from a post-abortion support group for those experiencing
difficulties, reported that adolescents were more likely to "feel forced by
circumstances to have the abortion," and reported "greater severity of
psychological stress." 267
In a study specifically designed to test the Supreme Court's premise that
"minors are particularly susceptible to psychological distress following
abortion," researchers found significant differences between the reactions of
minors and adults one month following abortion, but no differences two years
after abortion.268 The study tested for depression,269 decision satisfaction, 270
benefit-harm appraisals, 271 and specific emotions related to the abortion.272 The
142 (1984) (noting that, five hours post-abortion, there is no significant relationship between age and
anxiety, depression, or hostility); D.T. Moseley et al., Psychological Factors that Predict Reaction to
Abortion, 37 J.CLINICAL PSYCH. 276, 277 (1981) (finding, in the recovery room, there is no significant
correlation between age and post-abortion hostility, depression, or anxiety); Joy D. Osofsky & Howard
J. Osofsky, The Psychological Reaction of Patients to Legalized Abortion, 42 AM.
J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 48, 56 (1972) (finding no statistically significant relationship between age and guilt
over a abortion).
264. Joy D. Osofsky et al., Psychological Effects of Abortion: With Emphasis Upon Immediate
Reactions and Follow Up, in THE ABORTION EXPERIENCE: PSYCHOLOGICAL & MEDICAL IMPACT 188

(Joy D. Osofsky & Howard J. Osofsky eds., 1973).
265. Edmund C. Payne et al., Outcome Following Therapeutic Abortion, 33 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 725, 729 (1976). Although the Payne study did not involve minor women, it nonetheless
found that youth was a significant factor in negative psychological outcomes post-abortion.
266. Nancy E. Adler, Emotional Responses of Women Following Therapeutic Abortion. 45 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 446, 450 (1975). The Adler study focused on "young" women, which the study
defined as women aged seventeen and older. As a result, the study encompasses both minors and young
women who have reached the age of majority.
267. Franz & Reardon, supra note 263, at 163. While the selection of study subjects from a group
already seeking help makes the sample biased, which may make it difficult to assess how many
adolescents suffer negative psychological effects from abortion and how many do not, the study does
offer important information about differences between the reactions of adolescents and adults. And for
comparison purposes, it is important to note that the empirical data about women who have emotional
difficulties following adoption suffer from the same sampling bias. See supra note 178.
268. Wendy J. Quinton et al., Adolescents and Adjustment to Abortion: Are Minors at Greater
Risk?, 7 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L. 491 (2001).
269. Id. at 498 (asking how much six depressive symptoms bothered study participants since
having the abortion).
270. Id. (asking "[a]ll in all, how do you feel about your decision to have an abortion?";
respondents answered on a scale of one ("it was definitely the wrong decision") to five ("it was
definitely the right decision").
271. Id. at 498-99 (asking harm-based questions one month following the abortion. Respondents
were asked to respond on a five-point strongly-agree to strongly-disagree scale to the following
statements: "I feel stressed about having had this abortion," "I think this abortion has had a negative
effect on me," and "I feel this abortion has had harmful (or bad) consequences for me." At the two-year
appraisal, the first question was replaced with: "I feel my life is worse today because I had the abortion."
Benefit questions were asked, using the same strongly-agree/strongly-disagree scale: "I think the
abortion has had a positive (good) effect on me," "I have become a stronger person because of having
had the abortion," and "I have grown as a person from the experience.").
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researchers then asked respondents two years after the abortion whether, under
the same circumstances that existed two years ago, they would make the same
decision to have the abortion. 273
The results of the study showed no difference between adolescents and
adults on measurements of depression related to the abortion two years
following the abortion.274 However, the study revealed statistically significant
differences between minors and adults on decision satisfaction and benefitharm appraisal one month following abortion. 275 At the two year follow-up,
those differences had disappeared, with no significant difference between
adults and minors on any factor. 276
2. Adoption
While the majority of birth parents report general satisfaction from their
adoption decision, a significant portion experience long-term psychological
symptoms, as well as psychological symptoms prior to relinquishment and
immediately after placement.277 During the prerelinquishment period, a mother
experiences emotional issues in adjusting to pregnancy, as well as difficulties in
making complex decisions about relinquishment.278 Mothers considering
relinquishment report "conflicting feelings of shame, pride, desolation,
excitement, fear, terror, and denial," which "can be overwhelming and
disruptive." 279
In the period immediately following relinquishment,280 birth mothers report
that relinquishment brings "a powerful sense of loss and isolation."281 Birth
mothers reported traumatic dreams, sleep disruption, and "a sense that the
experience is surreal." 282 One study reported that fifty-five percent of birth
mothers found signing the adoption papers to be "one of the most difficult parts
272. Id. at 499. Respondents were asked about emotions specific to the abortion experience: happy,
satisfied, good, pleased, contented, sorry, sad, guilty, grief, regret, feelings of loss, blue, low, angry at
myself, angry at someone else, disappointed with myself, and relieved. Respondents were asked to
answer on a 5-point scale from one (not at all) to five (a great deal).
273. Id. at 499. Again, respondents were asked to answer on a five-point scale from one (definitely
no) to five (definitely yes.).
274. Id. at 501.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Mary O'Leary Wiley & Amanda Baden, Birth Parents in Adoption: Research, Practice, and
CounselingPsychology, 33 COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGIST 13, 26, 29 (2005).

278. Id. at 16.
279. Id. See also Linda Theron & Nadine Dunn, Coping Strategiesfor Adolescent Birth-Mothers
Who Return to School Following Adoption, 26 S. AFR. J. EDUC. 491 (2006) (discussing mothers'
postrelinquishment school performance).
280. This period is defined in the psychological literature as the first two years following
relinquishment. Wiley & Baden, supra note 277, at 26.
281. Id. (citing Anne Brodzinsky, Surrendering an Infant for Adoption: The Birthmother
Experience, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION 293 (Anne Brodzinsky & Marshall Schechter eds.,
1990)).
282. Wiley & Baden, supranote 277, at 26.
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of the adoption process," and sixty-five percent of birth mothers reported
283
feeling grief six months after birth.
In comparing adolescents who chose to
parent to those who chose to relinquish for adoption, those who relinquished
were less comfortable with their decision than those who parented.284 Another
study, however, showed no significant difference in psychological outcomes
between adolescents who placed and adolescents who parented.2 85 In one study
of birth mothers who returned to school after relinquishment, researchers found
that the negative emotions felt by birth mothers adversely affected school
performance.286 The birth mothers who experienced the most deterioration in
school performance were preoccupied with grief and regret concerning the
relinquishment decision and thought frequently about their personal loss. The
majority of birth mothers expressed negative expectations about the future,
expecting the bleakness they currently experienced to continue into the
future. 287 The feelings interfered with motivation, and, as a result, negatively
affected school performance. "The greatest deterioration in school performance
was noted when birth mothers felt there was nothing to live for." 288
Birth mothers also experience long-term effects of adoption relinquishment
on emotions and well-being.289 While some researchers found that birth
mothers reported feelings of satisfaction four years after birth and positive
outcomes on some socio-demographic and social psychological outcomes, 290
most also experience continuing grief and loss. 29 1 Long-term effects include
ongoing depression, shame, and negative self-image.292 Birth mothers report

283. Id. at 27 (citing Linda F. Cushman et al., Placing an Infant for Adoption: The Experiences of
Young Birthnothers, 38 Soc. WORK 264 (1993)).
284. Debra Kalmuss et al., Short-Term Consequences of Parenting Versus Adoption Among Young
Unmarried Women, 54 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 80 (1992) (referring to the short-term consequences of
parenting versus placing for adoption).
285. Steven D. McLaughlin et al., To Parent or Relinquish: Consequences fbr Adolescent Mothers,
33 Soc. WORK 320 (1988).
286. Theron & Dunn, supra note 279, at 495.
287. Id. at 496. See also Wiley & Baden, supra note 277, at 26 (noting that birth mothers
"consistently report that their hope to be able to 'get on with their life' doesn't reach fruition").
288. Theron & Dunn, supra note 279, at 497.
289. Wiley & Baden, supra note 277, note that research on the long-term effects of adoption
relinquishment tend to be based on self-selecting samples or on samples from birth mothers seeking
treatment. Id. at 30. Because of this sampling bias, "[n]o data were found in either the clinical or
empirical literature on birth parents that suggest that birth parents cope well with their decision to
relinquish." Id. While this sampling bias may make it difficult to assess how many birth parents suffer
long-term effects and how many do not, the studies do offer important information about negative
effects that birth mothers may experience long-term. As with women who experience emotional
difficulties following abortion, it is important to note that the empirical data about women who have
emotional difficulties following abortion suffer from the same sampling bias. See discussion supra note
267.
290. Pearila B. Namerow et al., The Consequences of Placing Versus Parenting Among Young
Unmarried Women, 25 MARRIAGE & FAM. REv. 175 (1997).

291. Wiley & Baden, supra note 277, at 29.
292.

ROBIN WINKLER & MARGARET VAN KEPPEL, RELINQUISHING MOTHERS IN ADOPTION:

THEIR LONG-TERM ADJUSTMENT (1984); George M. Burnell & Mary Ann Norfleet, Women Who Place
Their Infant Upfbr Adoption: A Pilot Study, 16 PATIENT COUNSELING & HEALTH EDUC. 169 (1979).
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feeling unlovable. 293 These feelings can cause birth mothers future difficulties
in forming attachments to romantic partners and subsequent children.294 Issues
with future parenting include "intense attachment to and overprotection of
children born to and raised by birthmothers after the placement of a child for
adoption." 295 Birth mothers who kept their relinquishment a secret feared that
others would reject them if the secret were discovered. 296 Birth mothers
experienced what one researcher calls the "psychological presence" of the
relinquished child, discrediting the frequently asserted notion that birth mothers
would forget about the relinquishment experience and continue on their prepregnancy life trajectory. 297 Birth mothers also experience a higher rate of
secondary infertility (an inability to become pregnant after a previous
pregnancy) than the population at large, and many have no other children. 298 In
one study, the majority of birth mothers reported "no decrease in feelings of
sadness, anger, and guilt since their relinquishment up to 30 years [before]." 299
C. Importanceof the Decision

Parental involvement in a minor's decision about abortion is often justified
by the consequential nature of the decision. The hypothesis seems to be that
while minors might be able to make decisions about less important matterswhat courses to take in school, who to date, whether they agree or disagree on
matters of politics and morality and religion-the abortion decision is different.
Some of the differences are incorporated into the two prior justifications for
parental involvement-the health risks and the emotional risks. But the
Supreme Court has described the decision as important, separate and apart from
these issues.300 What marks the decision as important can be unraveled into
three strands: 1) the immediacy of the decision, 2) the permanence of the
decision, and 3) the effect of the decision beyond the interests of the minor
293. Wiley & Baden, supra note 277, at 29.
294. Id. at 29-30.
295. Cinda L. Christian et al., Grief Resolution of Birthmothers in Confidential, Time-Limited
Mediated, Ongoing Mediated, and Fully Disclosed Adoptions, I ADOPTION Q. 35, 39 (1997) (citing
Edward K. Rynearson, Relinquishment and its Maternal Complications:A PreliminaryStudy, 139 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 338 (1982)).

296. Wiley & Baden, supra note 277, at 30. Secrecy about the adoption, and the lack of opportunity
to express feelings about the adoption, correlate strongly with unresolved grief, guilt, and shame about
the adoption placement. Michael De Simone, Birth Mother Loss: ContributingFactors to Unresolved
Grief 24 CLINICAL SOC. WORK J. 65 (1996).

297. De Simone, supra note 296, at 65; Deborah Lewis Fravel et al., Birthmother Perceptions of
the Psychologically Present Adopted Child: Adoption Openness and Boundary Ambiguity, 49 FAM. REL.
425 (2000).
298. M.J. Carr, Birthmothers and Subsequent Children: The Role of Personality Traits and
Attachment History, 9 J. Soc. DISTRESS & HOMELESS 339 (2000); Eva Y. Deykin et al., The
PostadoptionExperience ofSurrenderingParents,54 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 271, 276-77 (1984).
299. Wiley & Baden, supranote 277, at 31 (citing J.T. Condon, PsychologicalDisability in Women
Who Relinquish a Babyfor Adoption, 144 MED. J. AUSTL. 117, 117-19 (1986)).
300. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979).
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birth mother. Decisions about relinquishment of parental rights and adoption
placement share these concerns with decisions about abortion.
1. Immediacy
In Bellotti v. Baird, the Supreme Court noted that the immediacy of the
decision about abortion made it different from other decisions that might face a
minor:
The pregnant minor's options are much different from those facing a
minor in other situations, such as deciding whether to marry. A minor
not permitted to marry before the age of majority is required simply to
postpone her decision. She and her intended spouse may preserve the
opportunity for later marriage should they continue to desire it. A
pregnant adolescent, however, cannot preserve for long the possibility
of aborting, which effectively expires in a matter of weeks from the
onset of pregnancy.301
The Court further noted that if those short weeks were to pass, then the
minor mother might have to face the enormous consequences of teen
302
parenting.
The decision about adoption placement shares a similar, if not identical,
sense of immediacy. Professor James Dwyer writes of "the urgency to act
immediately after birth to get babies into permanent families," because of the
importance of the infant attaching to the adoptive parents. 30 3 Professor
Elizabeth Samuels has noted, in an article titled Time to Decide, that an
expectant mother's decision about adoption placement is time-sensitive. 304 In
looking at cases where a birth mother seeks to regain her child, Professor
Samuels writes:
Perhaps most starkly, they highlight the very short periods of time that
are provided under a majority of state laws after which a mother's
consent may effectively be given and become irrevocable. In a number
of other countries-including a majority of European countries and
Australian states-consent may not be given or does not become final
for a period of approximately six weeks. In approximately half the

301. Id.
302. Id.
303. James G. Dwyer, First Parents: Reconceptualizing Newborn Adoption, 37 CAP. U. L. REV.
293, 299 (2008) (emphasis added).
304. Elizabeth J. Samuels, Time to Decide? The Laws Governing Mothers' Consents to the
Adoption of Their Newborn Infants, 72 TENN. L. REV. 509 (2005).
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U.S. states, however, irrevocable consent can be established in as short
a period as less than four days after birth.305
And the time within which a placing mother has to decide or to change her
mind is growing shorter with each legal reform of adoption laws. Professor
Samuels notes that a number of states have sharply limited consent or
revocation periods in recent years. For example, at one time Louisiana allowed
a birth mother to revoke her consent at any time before a final decree of
adoption was entered. Then in 1960, the time was shortened, allowing for
revocation only until an interlocutory decree of adoption was entered. Then in
1979, the time period for revocation was reduced to thirty days, and the
revocation did not automatically provide for the return of the child to the birth
306
mother, but only if the return served the best interests of the child.
That
thirty-day period is generous compared to other states' alternatives. According
to Professor Samuels, in Colorado, a birth mother's consent is irrevocable after
four days. 307 Thus, the law creates a sense of immediacy for the decision about
relinquishment of parental rights and consent to adoption.
Another source for the immediacy of the adoption placement decision is
prospective adoptive parents. Adoptive parents typically desire to adopt an
infant as soon after birth as possible.308 Indeed, it is not uncommon for the
adoptive parents to be in the delivery room for the birth of the infant, and for
one of the adoptive parents to cut the umbilical cord.309 And adoptive parents
have a great deal of control over the system of adoption, including early
relinquishment and short revocation requirements. Professor Samuels notes that
adoptive parents, as the "paying customers," are given great deference by child
placing agencies.310 In addition, child placing agencies are likely to defer to the
adoptive parents "because they usually bring greater social and financial
advantages compared to those of most birth parents."3 1'
2. Permanence
The Supreme Court has also noted that the decision about abortion is
important because of its permanence. Once the abortion is obtained, there is no
305. Id. at 512-13.

306. Id. at 546.
307. Id. at 545.
308. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, CWLA STANDARDS OF EXCELLENCE FOR ADOPTION

SERVICES 4 (rev. ed. 2000); Dwyer, supra note 303, at 299.
309. Marianne Berry, The Practice of Open Adoption: Findingsfrom a Study of 1396 Adoptive
Families, 13 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 379, 386 (2002) ("30% of the adoptive parents were
present at the birth of the adopted child (half of those in the delivery room and half nearby in the
hospital)."); Jeffrey J. Haugaard, Natalie M. West & Alison M. Moed, Open Adoptions, 4 ADOPTION Q.
89, 93 (2000) (reporting similar figures for presence of adoptive parents at birth of child).
310. Samuels, supra note 304, at 525.
311. 2 MADELYN FREUNDLICH, ADOPTION AND ETHICS 27 (2000).
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other option. And once the decision to forgo the abortion is made, and the time
to obtain an abortion has passed, the decision to give birth is equally
permanent. The Court said in Bellotti v. Baird:
Moreover, the potentially severe detriment facing a pregnant woman,
is not mitigated by her minority. Indeed, considering her probable
education, employment skills, financial resources, and emotional
maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally burdensome for
a minor. ... In sum, there are few situations in which denying a minor
the right to make an important decision will have consequences so
grave and indelible. 3 12
Because of the adoption option not mentioned by the Court, the decision to
forgo abortion does not make teen parenting inevitable. However, as noted in
the earlier discussion of the medical, emotional, and psychological effects of
adoption placement for the birth mother, one's status as a birth mother has
indelible consequences.313 Moreover, given the difficulty of revoking a
decision to relinquish parental rights and consent to adoption, that decision is
permanent. 314
The birth parent's relinquishment of parental rights marks a permanent
change in the parent's rights, but the relinquishment works the same degree of
permanent change on the adoptee's relationship to that parent. The adoptee can
no longer rely on the parental obligations that law creates, including the
parent's obligation of financial support. 315 Termination of parental rights is,
therefore, permanent.
3. Effects Beyond the Mother
With regard to the decision about abortion, one must acknowledge that
many people believe that the fetus represents a human life, and has the same
status as a person who is born. 316 Thus, they are concerned about the effect of
312. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979).
313. See supra notes 256-260, 277-299 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 303-307 and accompanying text.
315. 2 AM. JUR. 2, Adoption § 170 (2013). In some stepparent adoptions, termination of the
parental rights of a parent so that the spouse of the other parent can adopt the child does not extinguish
child-support obligations.
316. Resolving this highly contested issue is beyond the scope of this Article. As the Court noted in
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992), "Men and women of good
conscience can disagree, and we suppose some always shall disagree, about the profound moral and
spiritual implications of terminating a pregnancy, even in its earliest stage." For the attempts of others to
resolve the question, see LAURENCE 1.TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990); Mark T.
Brown, The Morality of Abortion and the Deprivation of Futures, 26 J. MED. ETHICS 103 (2000); Ruth

Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love. Compassion, and Wisdom, 77 CALIF. L. REV.
1011 (1989); Don Marquis, Why Abortion is Immoral, 86 J. PHIL. 183 (1989); THE MORALITY OF
ABORTION: LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES (John T. Noonan, Jr., ed.,

1970); Judith Jarvis
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the minor's abortion decision on that life. The law does not recognize the fetus
as a person. 317 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that a state
has an interest, beyond the health of the mother, in the potential for life that the
fetus represents. 318 Because of that interest, a state can enact laws informed by
a preference that the pregnancy be continued rather than terminated.319 In this
way, the law recognizes the effect of the abortion decision beyond the minor
mother herself, and concerns itself with the effect of the abortion in ending the
potential for life.
For those who believe the fetus is a person, the comparison to the effects of
adoption on an adoptee may not seem apt. However, there is little doubt that
the adoptee is a person, and is affected significantly by the adoption placement
decision:
Adopted children are thought to face some unique developmental
challenges. "[U]nlike children growing up with their birth parents,"
Triseliotis observes, "those adopted have to accomplish or be aided to
accomplish a number of additional psychological tasks, which most of
them do successfully." Those tasks include attaching to new parents,
understanding the meaning of adoption, acknowledging the differences
involved in having two sets of parents, and "dealing with the sense of
loss of the original parents and the element of rejection that it
conveys." 320
While adoption often has a positive effect on adoptees, especially when
compared to those who are raised in institutions or in foster care and never
adopted, 321 there are also lifelong issues, some quite negative, that face many
Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, I PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971); Mary Anne Warren, Do Potential
People Have Moral Rights?, 7 CAN. J. PHIL. 275 (1977). Note that adoption also presents moral issues.
See generally THE MORALITY OF ADOPTION: SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL, THEOLOGICAL, AND LEGAL

PERSPECTIVES (Timothy Patrick Jackson ed., 2005).
317. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (stating that "the word 'person,' as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn").
318. Id. at 150 (rejecting the notion that the Court must decide that life begins at conception,
accepting "the less rigid claim that as long as at least potential life is involved, the State may assert
interests beyond the protection of the pregnant woman alone"). See also Casey, 505 U.S. at 869
(observing that the state's "concern for the life of the unborn" has "at a later point in fetal
development . . . sufficient force so that the right of the woman to terminate the pregnancy can be
restricted").
319. Casey, 505 U.S. at 872 (noting that a state may enact laws designed to encourage a pregnant
woman "to know that there are philosophic and social arguments of great weight that can be brought to
bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to full term"); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977)
(observing that "[tihe Constitution does not forbid a State or city, pursuant to democratic processes,
from expressing a preference for normal childbirth").
320. Samuels, supra note 304, at 530-31 (quoting JOHN TRISELIOTIS ET AL., ADOPTION: THEORY,
POLICY AND PRACTICE 35 (1997)).
321.
EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INSTITUTE, BEYOND CULTURE CAMP: PROMOTING
HEALTHY IDENTITY FORMATION IN ADOPTION 14 (2009); David M. Brodzinsky, Long-Term Outcomes

in Adoption, 3 ADOPTION 153, 153 (1993).
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adoptees.322 Many adoptees' struggles with adoption identity, while not
reaching the level of psychopathology, may explain high levels of behavioral
problems observed in adopted children and adolescents.323 In addition, while
adoptees represent less than two percent of the childhood population in the
United States, they represent ten to fifteen percent of those in mental health
-324
care facilities.
Adoptees may not see adoption as the happy event adoptive parents and
society suggest that it is, but as a more ambivalent experience.325 Adoptees
may experience adoption as a profound loss, despite the "replacement" of the
lost birth family by adoptive family.326 Adoptees can have problems with fears
of abandonment and rejection, and with trust and attachment that affect future
relationships.327 Because of cultural biases that favor biological families,
328
adoptees may face stigma associated with being adopted. Thus, the effect on
the adoptee of a birth mother's decision to place a child for adoption cannot be
denied.

322. EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST., supra note 321, at 29-30. This study found that,

against expectations that adoption issues would taper off for adults, for both same-race and interracial
adoptees, adoptee identity continued into adulthood. The study "[r]esult suggests the lifelong nature of
identity work and the reality that adulthood is a crucial period in which adoptive and racial/ethnic
identities continue to be salient for adopted persons." Id. at 30. Almost one-fourth of same-race
adoptees reported, as adults, that they felt extremely or somewhat uncomfortable with their identity as
an adopted person. Id. at 32.
323. David Brodzinsky et al., Children's UnderstandingofAdoption, 55 CHILD DEv. 869 (1984);
Femmie Juffer, Children'sAwareness ofAdoption and Their Problem Behavior in Families with 7-YearOld Internationally Adopted Children, 9 ADOPTION Q. I (2006); Daniel W. Smith & David M.
Brodzinsky, Stress and Coping in Adopted Children: A Developmental Study, 23 J. CLINICAL CHILD
PSYCHOL. 91 (1994).
324. David M. Brodzinsky, A Stress and Coping Model of Adoption Adjustment, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION 3 (David M. Brodzinsky & Marshall D. Schechter eds., 1990). See also
Michael Wierzbicki, Psychological Adjustment of Adoptees: A Meta-Analysis, 22 J. CLINICAL CHILD
PSYCHOL. 447 (1993) (finding that adoptees are significantly overrepresented in clinical populations). It
is possible that the overrepresentation of adoptees in clinical populations is not because of increased
incidences of psychological problems, but because of increased rates of referrals by adoptive parents and
professionals who are aware of issues relating to adoption and, therefore, might be more inclined to
refer. See Brodzinsky, supra note 321, at 154.
325. Brodzinsky, supra note 321; Penny Callan Partridge, The Particular Challenges of Being
Adopted, 61 SMITH C. STUD. Soc. WORK, 197, 199 (1991).
326. Partridge, supra note 325, at 199.
327. Michael F. McGinn, Developmental Challenges fbr Adoptees Across the Life Cycle, in
HANDBOOK OF ADOPTION 61, 65 (Rafael A. Javier et al. eds., 2007).

328. Consider this description of the stigma of being adopted: "Adopted children are seen as
coming from a defective biological line; their birth parents either did not want them or were immoral
and dysfunctional. Adopted children are seen as damaged goods, presumed to have suffered
maltreatment after birth before being rescued and processed by the child protective system, and
therefore, likely to have lifelong struggles.... Adopted children also appear atomistic, because they are
disconnected from their extended biological family and because we suspect their extended adoptive
family keeps them at arms length, never treating them as full or equal members of the family. They are
persons with no real family. Because of this perception, adopted children are often uncomfortable
revealing that they were adopted. This perception is a major reason why many adoptees undertake a
search for their birth parents: we communicate to them that they are deficient, lacking something of
great importance, and as a result, they go to great lengths to try to become complete." Dwyer, supra note
303, at 295-96.
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The many similarities between minors' decisionmaking about abortion and
about adoption placement-physical and emotional risks to the mother and
effects beyond the mother-suggest that similar treatment of those decisions is
called for. To the extent that minors have impaired decisionmaking capacity in
one arena, they lack it in similar arenas. Similar treatment, however, does not
mean identical treatment. There is at least one significant difference between
the abortion and adoption decisions-the legal complexity of the adoption
decision-that suggests that parental notification may not be an adequate
protection of a minor's interests in the course of decisionmaking about
adoption.329 This is reflected in the few states that treat a minor's decision to
terminate parental rights and consent to adoption differently from an adult's
decision. In lieu of parental notification, those states provide for appointment
of a guardian ad litem or an independent attorney for the minor parent. 330 The
following section discusses the appropriate remedy among remedies and
proposes statutory reform.
V. PROPOSED STATUTORY REFORM

Stephanie Bennett was a 17-year-old mother and student, living at home in
Ohio with her supportive mom and step-dad when she revealed concerns about
motherhood to guidance counselor Thomas Saltsman ... [who] immediately
arrangedfor her to meet with [an] ... adoption agency on school grounds,
duringschool hours.
Days after theirfirst meeting, Stephanie took baby Evelyn and ran away
from home. Hours later, she signed the paperwork allowing the agency to take
her daughter away.331
A. Choosing a Remedy Among Remedies

States that have provided additional protections for minors making the
decision about adoption placement offer one of three protections: consent or
notification of the minor's parent (the child's grandparent), appointment of a
guardian ad litem for the minor parent, or a requirement that the minor parent
be represented by legal counsel independent of the adoptive parents or adoption
agency. While each has its benefits, the appropriate solution rests on the legal
nature of the decision a minor parent is being asked to make, not with parental
involvement or the best interests protection of a guardian ad litem.

329. See infra notes 331-353 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 183-243 and accompanying text.
33 1. Jessica DelBalzo, CoercedAdoption Should Concern Parents:Pregnantand Parenting Teens
Targeted by Adoption Agencies, YAHOO! (Mar. 2, 2007), www.voices.yahoo.com/coerced-adoptionconcern-parents-195318.html?cat-25.
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While there can be disagreement over parental involvement in minors'
abortion decisions, it seems that at least parental involvement is tailored to
addressing issues relevant to the decision. A parent may be able to help weigh
the medical and psychological effects of abortion and adoption placement, but a
parent is not as capable at helping a teen navigate the multitude of complex
legal issues related to adoption. 332 There are also practical and constitutional
considerations related to parental consent in a minor's adoption decision that do
not exist with a minor's abortion decision. What, for example, would happen if
a minor parent wanted to relinquish parental rights and the minor's parent
refused to consent to that decision? A minor cannot be compelled to parent any
more than she can be compelled not to parent. Ordinarily, when the minor's
parent refuses to consent it is because that minor's parent (the child's
grandparent) is interested in parenting the grandchild. But if that is not the
case, a judge will be called upon to resolve the dispute and would need to
appoint counsel and/or a guardian ad litem for all involved.
Though a guardian ad litem is often a licensed attorney, the role of a
guardian ad litem is not the same as independent legal counsel:
An attorney and a guardian ad litem, however, are bound by very
different professional standards defining each one's obligations
towards their clients. The representative serving in the role of an
attorney is generally bound by guidelines of professional
responsibility, while a representative serving as a guardian ad litem is
not necessarily bound by the same client obligations. In general, a
guardian ad litem is not bound by the client's expressed wishes and is
able to advocate for a result that he or she believes to be in the minor's
best interests. By contrast, an individual serving as an attorney is
obligated under professional and ethical rules to advocate for a minor's
expressed preferences, irrespective of what the attorney believes to be
in the minor's best interests. Furthermore, an attorney is obligated to
maintain client confidentiality under ethical guidelines, while a
guardian ad litem generally does not have any confidentiality
obligations towards his or her minor client. 333

332. This is not to suggest that parents are unimportant in the decision. Most studies show that
successful teen parents have a support system, including parents. See Sarah E. Oberlander et al., African
American Adolescent Mothers and Grandmothers: A MultigenerationalApproach to Parenting,39 AM.
J.COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 37 (2007).

333. Elizabeth Susan Graybill, Assisting Minors Seeking Abortions in Judicial Bypass Proceedings:
A Guardian ad Litem Is No Substitute for an Attorney, 55 VAND. L. REv. 581, 585-86 (2002).
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The distinctive role of guardian ad litem is not adequate protection of a
minor parent's decision about the complex legal matters involved in the
adoption placement decision. 334
Adoption is a legally created and regulated enterprise. The hallmark of
adoption law, traced to the first "modem" adoption statute in 1851, is the
complete replacement of the biological family with the adoptive family:
The early adoption statutes provided a mechanism for the transfer of
full parental control from one person to another. The statutes carefully
specified that the adoptive parents stood in the shoes of the biological
parents with respect to custody, obedience, and care. They explicitly
transferred "all" parental rights from the biological parents to the
adopting parents, with a corresponding transfer of the child's legal
obligations of obedience, support, and maintenance. Thus, although the
parent-child relationship was transformed with respect to the parent's
identity, the nature of parental rights and authority remained
unchallenged. Adoption thus confirmed the indivisibility of parental
rights by allowing new parents to replace legally the birth parents. 335
For that replacement to be effectuated, a court must first terminate the
parental rights of the birth parents before granting parental rights to the
adoptive family. 336
The Supreme Court has long recognized parental rights as fundamental
rights under the Constitution. 337 Because of the fundamental nature of parental
rights, the Supreme Court has said that a state cannot lightly revoke those
rights. When a state seeks to terminate parental rights involuntarily (without the
parent's consent), the Constitution requires a heightened standard of clear and
convincing evidence.338 Despite the fundamental nature of parental rights, a
parent can voluntarily relinquish these rights.
Voluntary relinquishment of parental rights cuts off all parental rights,
including "the parent's right to the custody of the child and his right to visit the
child, his right to control the child's training and education, the necessity for
the parent to consent to the adoption of the child and the parent's right to the
334. See Tari Eitzen, A Child's Right to Independent Legal Representation in a Custody Dispute,
19 FAM. L.Q. 53, 60-66 (1986) (arguing that, in custody disputes, independent legal counsel for minors
ensures that their interests are protected); Catherine J. Ross, From Vulnerability to Voice: Appointing
Counselfor Children in Civil Litigation, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1571, 1595-1614 (1996) (independent
legal counsel for minors ensures access to courts); Shannan L. Wilber, Independent Counsel for
Children, 27 FAM. L.Q. 349, 350-51 (1993) (claiming that independent legal counsel is important for
minors in the legal arena).
335. Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitute or the Real Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1125 (2003).
336. 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adoption

§ 170 (2013).

337. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 107 (1996);
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
338. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982).
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earnings of the child, and the parent's right to inherit from or through the
child." 339 A minor birth parent may not know or understand what rights parents
have and thus, does not fully understand the rights she is relinquishing. 340
Consider the case of seventeen-year-old LaTonya Chienta Anderson, who
signed a relinquishment and consent that read as follows:
Know all men by these presents, that 1, LaTonya Chienta Anderson,
the mother of [the child] ... do hereby consent to the adoption of my
said child . . . in order that said child may have all the privileges which

may accord her by the Laws of Alabama upon her legal adoption. And
I do hereby consent and request that the Probate Judge make all such
orders and decrees as may be necessary or proper to legally effectuate
said adoption. 34 1
The consent form made no mention of the termination of LaTonya's rights,
only that the child would acquire certain unnamed legal privileges. The
affidavit gives permission to the judge to make all orders necessary to legally
effectuate the adoption but does not inform LaTonya that one of those
necessary orders would be the permanent and irrevocable termination of her
parental rights.342 The child was being adopted by the parents of the putative
father, and the mother had been freely visiting the child while in the custody of
the grandparents, but nothing in the affidavit informs LaTonya that she would
no longer have a legal right to visit her child.343 There was evidence from the
social worker conducting an investigation prior to finalization of the adoption
that the mother did not understand the finality of the adoption and the legal
implications. After the social worker explained these applications to the
mother, she said she wanted to withdraw her consent. 344 The appellate court
held, however, that the consent was valid because the mother "freely and
willingly" signed the consent form after reading it and "cho[se] not to question
anything."345 Seventeen-year-old LaTonya was not represented by counsel; the
adoptive parents were.346
This case illustrates perfectly why a minor needs additional protections in
signing a consent to adoption. It is easy to imagine that LaTonya saw the
adoption as a way to make the custody "legal" without understanding the
implications for her own parental rights. All that is encompassed in her request
339.
132).
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.

McCabe v. McCabe, 78 P.3d. 956, 958 (Okla. 2003) (citing 1968 Okla. Sess. Laws, Ch. 282, §
Anderson v. Hetherington, 560 So.2d 1078 (Ala. 1990).
Id. at 1080.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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that the judge "make all such orders and decrees as may be necessary or proper
to legally effectuate said adoption," was likely just so much mumbo-jumbo to
the minor mother. 347
Relinquishment of parental rights and consent to adoption must be
knowingly and voluntarily given.348 Because of the complexity of the legal
decisions involved in adoption, it is difficult to see how a minor's actions in
this regard could be knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily given-at least
without support from a legal professional. Consider a student in my Adoption
Law class. 349 Now an adult, she had relinquished a child for adoption when she
was sixteen years old. She shared that information with the class, and said that
being given a choice of adoptive parents and the promise of continuing contact
was key to her decision to place her child for adoption. During the course of the
class, she was dismayed to learn that the promise of continuing contact-an
"open adoption" agreement-was not legally enforceable in the state in which
she entered into it.350 When she looked with adult eyes at her relinquishment
affidavit, she realized that she had relinquished the child to the adoption
agency, not to her chosen adoptive parents, and that the agency could have
placed her child with other adoptive parents.3st She learned during the course
352
of the class that her child's right to inherit from her had been terminated. She
discovered that she could not have access to her child's original birth
certificate, even though her name was on it as mother. 353 This birth mother was
obviously intelligent, as evidenced by her graduation from high school and

347. Id.
348. See, e.g., In re J.M.P., 528 So.2d 1002, 1007 (1988).
349. This story is shared with the student's permission, though her identity is not included to
protect her privacy.
350. That state, Texas, did not allow legally enforceable postadoption contact agreements until
2003, years after the student's adoption placement decision. For more about the complexity of the
enforcement of post-adoption contact agreements, see supra notes 289-299 and accompanying text.
351. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.103(b)(12) (West 2010), which provides that the affidavit of
relinquishment of parental rights may name the prospective adoptive parent but need not do so. Instead,
a child placement agency can be named as the managing conservator of the child. The managing
conservator can then consent to the adoption with no consent of the biological parent needed under TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.010 (West 2010).
352. The law student had been pleased to learn in her course on wills and intestate succession that
under TEX. PROBATE CODE ANN. § 40 (West 2010), her child could inherit from her. She did not
realize, however, that the trial court in her adoption placement had cut off the right of inheritance in the
decree terminating her parental rights, as permitted by TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.206 (West 2010).
She did not attend the hearing, and as a sixteen-year-old, it is unlikely she would have understood what
was happening since she was not represented by counsel.
353. Only the court that granted the adoption may grant access to the original birth certificate.
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 192.008 (West 2010). Any other information about the adoption,
including current information about the identity and location of the adopted child, would only come
about from the mutual consent registry in Texas, TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.407 (West 2010), and
only if both birth mother and adopted child registered and were matched. Absent a match, the student
would only be able to get the information by going to court and showing good cause. TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 162.022 (West 2010); see also Dan Tilly, Confidentiality ofAdoption Records in Texas: A Good
Case for Defining Good Cause, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 531, 557-58 (2005) (observing that simply desiring
a reunion between birth mother and adopted child is not good cause).

Minors' Consent in Abortion and Adoption

2013]

151

college and her admission to law school. But at age sixteen, she was not aware
of the legal intricacies of the adoption placement decision.
The issue of open adoption, or post-adoption contact, is a particularly
thorny legal issue in adoption placement. 354 Since adoption requires termination
of the parental rights of the biological parents, they possess no residual rights to
insist on post-adoption contact.355 Only in the minority of states where there is
legislation on point does a birth parent have an enforceable right to postadoption contact.356 It is still common practice in states without enforceable
open-adoption agreements, however, for agencies and adoptive parents to enter
into such unenforceable "agreements.'" 357 For example, Amazing Grace
Adoption Agency, based in Raleigh, North Carolina, offers the following
services to birth parents: choosing and meeting with an adoptive family,
"different levels of openness with the adoptive family," and receiving
information and pictures of your baby following an adoptive placement. 35 8 if
you visit the website of a Missouri adoption agency, a page will describe open

354. See CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,

Birth and Adoptive
Families (2011),
Between
Postadoption Contact Agreements
https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/Iaws-policies/statutes/cooperative.pdf. See also Annette Ruth
Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption: Implications for Collaborative Adoption Law and
Practice, 75 B.U. L. REv. 997 (1995); Annette Ruth Appell, Reflections on the Movement Toward a
More Child-CenteredAdoption, 32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (2010); Cynthia E. Cordle , Open Adoption:
The Need/br Legislative Action, 2 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 275 (1995); Amy L. Doherty, Foster Care
and Adoption: A Look at Open Adoption, II J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 591 (1997); Leigh Gaddie,
Open Adoption, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW 499 (2009); Margaret M. Mahoney, Open
Adoption in Context: The Wisdom and Enfbrceability of Visitation OrdersJbr FormerParents Under the
Uniform Adoption Act § 4-143, 51 FLA. L. REv. 89 (1999).
355. See, e.g., McCabe v. McCabe, 78 P.3d. 956, 958 (Okla. 2003) (holding that the termination of
parental rights cuts off all parental rights); Tammy M. Somogye, Opening Minds to Open Adoption, 45
KAN. L. REV. 619, 623 (1997) (holding that adoption in Kansas severs all rights of the biological
parents, without an exception for establishing visitation rights).
356. According to the Child Welfare Information Gateway, supra note 354, the following states
have some form of enforceable continuing post-adoption contact: Alaska, Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Six states have statutes that explicitly
provide that while open adoption agreements may be entered into, they are not enforceable by the court:
Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee. In all other states,
statutes are silent about the enforceability of open adoption agreements.
357. According to the Child Welfare Information Gateway, supra note 354, six states have statutes
that explicitly provide that while open-adoption agreements may be entered into, they are not
enforceable by the court: Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee.
Yet, in those states, adoption agencies still offer "open adoption agreements."
358.

Types

of

Adoption,

AMAZING

GRACE

ADOPTIONS

AND

ORPHAN

CARE,

http://www.agadoptions.org/sample-page/types-of-adoption/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2013) (describing
open adoptions and stating that "the amount of contact (phone, face-to-face, email, letters, etc.) between
parties in an open adoption should be agreed upon before any legal documents are signed," implying
that such an agreement is legally enforceable); Id. at http://www.agadoptions.org/samplepage/questions/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2013) (stating that "adoptive families send pictures and reports of
the child once a month for the first year and then once a year until the child is 18 years old," without
mentioning that there is no way to legally enforce that arrangement). See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-3-610
(2010) (noting that though the parties could enter into an agreement regarding visitation and
communication, "the agreement itself shall not be enforceable").
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adoptions, and includes a testament by a birth mother describing her contact
with her relinquished child: "It was my desire to have an open adoption and this
has worked beautifully for all of us." 359 At Spirit of Faith Adoption Agency in
Ohio, the agency describes open adoption as an option: "After entrusting your
child to his/her adoptive parents, you will receive photos and written updates
within the first few weeks and every few months afterward. The Adoption
Coordinator will help to facilitate contact with the adoptive parents." 360 The
agency further assures prospective birth parents that "arrangements can be
made with the assistance of Spirit of Faith Adoptions to stay in touch with your
child's adoptive parents throughout his/her lifetime."361 The birth parents may
not be aware that the openness promised by these agencies will not be legally
binding.
In those states with enforceable open-adoption agreements, there are
complex legal requirements that serve to limit the parties who can enter into
such agreements and to limit the types of adoptions in which such agreements
are enforceable. For example, in Connecticut, post-adoption contact agreements
are only enforceable in adoptions from foster care, not in private adoptions. 362
In Nebraska, court-approved contact agreements are only renewable for twoyear terms.363 In Vermont, open adoption agreements are enforceable in
stepparent adoptions.3 6 In Indiana, the agreement is enforceable only if the
child is over age two at the time of the adoption or upon the agreement of the
adoptive parents and a birth parent,365 while in Oregon, if the child is under age
one, the child must have spent at least half his or her life with the birth relative
seeking an open adoption agreement.366 Similarly, in Oklahoma, the agreement
359. KENTUCKY

&

MISSOURI

ADOPTION

SERVICES,

ALLBLESSINGSINTERNATIONAL,

http://www.allblessings.org/birthparent/typesofadoption.shtmi (describing open adoption and making
two unenforceable promises: "[y]ou [the birth mother] choose the level of future contact you want" and
"[tihe families that our agency works with are required to provide regular updates and photographs of
the child they adopt"). The website does not mention that open-adoption agreements are unenforceable
in Missouri. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.080(4) (West 2010) (stating that upon completion of an
adoption, further contact is solely at the discretion of the adoptive parents).
360. What

to

Expect,

SPIRIT

OF

FAITH

ADOPTIONS,

http://www.spiritoffaithadoptions.org/supportforpregnancy/what-happens-next (last visited Mar. 20,
2013) (in describing what to expect after a birth mother contacts the agency, Step 8 promises: "[a]fter
entrusting your child to his/her adoptive parents, you will receive photos and written updates within the
first few weeks and every few months afterward. The Adoption Coordinator will help to facilitate
contact with the adoptive parents"). Ohio does not provide for enforcement of open adoption
agreements. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.65(A)(5) (West 2010) (all terms of open adoptions are
voluntary, and any party can withdraw at any time).
361. Is
Open
Adoption
for
You?,
SPIRIT
OF
FAITH
ADOPTIONS,
http://www.spiritoffaithadoptions.org/supportforpregnancy/open-closed-adoption-information/openadoption.
362. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-715(h) (2010). Providing the opportunity for open-adoption
agreements for children in state custody is used to incentivize parents whose rights are likely to be
involuntarily terminated to instead choose to voluntarily relinquish parental rights.
363. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-155-158 (2010).
364. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 4-112 (West 2010).
365. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-16-9 (West 2011).
366. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.305(3) (West 2008).
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is enforceable only if the child resided with the birth parent prior to the
adoption.367 In Montana, a court can refuse enforcement of an open adoption
agreement if enforcement would be detrimental to the child or undermine the
adoptive parent's parental authority, or if due to changed circumstances,
compliance with the agreement would be unduly burdensome.368 Even without
these limitations, most states with enforceable agreements require careful
attention to intricacies of the statutes. In most states that enforce open adoption
agreements, those agreements are enforceable only when approved by a court
and/or included in an adoption decree.369 In Texas, a post-adoption contact
agreement is enforceable only if a judge incorporates it in the termination of a
parental rights order; it is not enforceable if it is only included in the affidavit
for voluntary relinquishment of parental rights, or if it is only included in the
adoption decree.370 These are not requirements that a minor birth mother is
likely to know.
Minor birth parents may not be aware of legal rights associated with
revocation of consent,371 with inheritance rights, 372 with the right of access to
367. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §7505-1.5 (West 2000).
368. MONT. CODE ANN. §42-5-301 (2010).
369. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.23.180(j); 47.10.089(e) (2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.58
(West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.305 (2011).
370. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.2061(6) (2011). See also Queen v. Goeddertz, 48 S.W.3d 928
(Tex. App.-Beaumont 2001) (holding that a handwritten addition of visitation to an affidavit of
relinquishment of parental rights is not enforceable).
371. For example, all consents to adoption in Massachusetts are irrevocable. MASS. GEN. LAWS.
Ch. 210, § 2 (2008). In Hawaii, consent is irrevocable unless a court finds it would be in the child's best
interest to allow the revocation. HAW. REV. STAT. § 578-2(t) (2012). In other states, there are revocation
periods of various lengths. In Arkansas, for example, a birth mother has ten days in which to revoke
consent. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-209(b)(1) (2001). Birth mothers in Kentucky have twenty days to
revoke consent. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.500 (West 2012). Birth mothers in California have thirty
days in a direct placement adoption, unless the child is an American Indian child, in which the time limit
is two years. CA. FAM. CODE §§ 8814.5; 8700, 8606.5 (West 2010). In Colorado, a birth mother may
withdraw her consent within ninety days, but only if she establishes by clear and convincing evidence
that her consent was obtained by fraud or duress. Co. REV. STAT. § 19-5-104(7)(a) (2010). And in all
states, if the child is an American Indian child, "the consent of the parent may be withdrawn for any
reason at any time prior to the entry of a final decree of termination or adoption." Indian Child Welfare
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1913(c) (2006). See also Samuels, supra note 304, at 509. Furthermore, a right to
revoke consent may not mean that a relinquishing parent automatically regains custody of the child and
a return of parental rights. In a number ofjurisdictions, revocation of consent only triggers a hearing to
determine whether it would be in the best interests of the child for the birth mother's consent to be
vitiated. See, e.g., In re J.M.P, 528 So.2d 1002, 1012 (La. 1988), in which the birth mother "timely
exercised her right to revoke her consent," but rather than returning the child, the trial court conducted a
best interest of the child hearing where it compared the eighteen-year-old single mother, who was a
cashier at a grocery store and who was still living at home with her parents, with a two-parent
established household with a stay-at-home parent.
372. In Alaska, for example, all inheritance rights of the adopted child derived from the birth
parents or relatives of the birth parents are terminated, unless the adoption decree specifically continues
them. ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 13.12.114, 25.23.130 (West 2012). In Kansas, an adoption decree
terminates the right of the birth parent to inherit from the adopted child, but the adopted child may still
inherit from the birth parent. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2118 (West 2012). Upon the death of an adoptee in
Illinois, the birth parents can inherit from the adoptee "property that the child has taken from or through
the natural parent or the lineal or collateral kindred of the natural parent by gift, by will or under
intestate laws." 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/2-4(b), (d) (West 2012). In Texas, one statute giveth
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information and/or contact in the event of a medical emergency,373 or with any
of the other multitude of rights and obligations affected by the legal
relinquishment of parental rights and consent to an adoption. If the only adults
with whom the relinquishing minor interacts are the adoptive parents or the
lawyer or agency representing the adoptive parents, a minor will have little
access to information crucial to voluntary and knowing consent. The judge
overseeing the adoption is not usually in the position to serve this function.
Though adoption is a legal process, it is not uncommon for a birth mother never
to set foot in the courtroom. Statutes allow a birth parent to waive notice of
any and all hearings at the same time the affidavit of voluntary relinquishment
is signed.374 Thus, there is no opportunity for a birth parent to ask questions in
court, or for a judge to assess the maturity of the minor birth parent or what the
birth parent understands about the legal parental rights she is waiving.
Judicial involvement in the adoption does not necessarily allow for judicial
oversight of the minor's decision about adoption placement. Only appointment
of legal counsel, independent of the adoptive parents or adoption agency, can
ensure that a minor mother fully understands her legal rights before she
relinquishes them.
B. ProposedStatute
In order to adequately protect a minor parent's constitutionally protected
right to parent, a state's adoption statutes must require the appointment of legal
counsel for minor parents. That counsel must be independent of the adoptive

what another taketh away: the Probate Code provides that an adopted child can inherit from birth
parents, TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 40 (West 2012), while the Family Code provides that a birth child
inherits from birth parents only if the court does not terminate those inheritance rights in the decree
terminating parental rights. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.206 (West 2011).
373. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.50.500 (West 2012) (if an adult adoptee consents, the birth parent
can receive their current name and address); CAL. FAM. CODE § 9201 (West 2012) (if an adoptee is age
twenty-one or older and consents, the birth parent can receive identifying information). Many states
provide a mechanism for a birth parent, without being identified, to supply updated medical information
to an adoptee who requests it. Thus, a birth parent who develops a disease that may be inherited by her
birth child can supply that information even after the adoption is finalized. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 19-5-305 (West 2013). However, most do not provide a mechanism for an adoptee to provide medical
information to the birth parent. Thus, an adoptee who develops a disease likely inherited from a birth
parent cannot inform the birth parent, thus preventing early diagnosis and treatment of that birth parent
or other children of that birth parent. In those jurisdictions, a birth parent would only be able to access
such information by applying to the court. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-121 (West 2012)
(allowing disclosure only on showing of "compelling need"); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.022 (West
2011) (allowing disclose only on showing of "good cause"); Tilly, supra note 353 (collecting "good
cause" cases from multiple jurisdictions). And without knowing that the adopted child has developed
any such condition, the birth parent would be hard pressed to establish good cause.
374. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.103 (West 2011) (noting that an affidavit of voluntary
relinquishment of parental rights may contain a waiver of process in a suit to terminate the parent-child
relationship and formalize an adoption); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-339(a)(1)(ii) (West 2013)
(consent may include a waiver of right to notice of further proceedings).
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parents and/or the adoption agency so as to avoid any conflict of interest.375
The statute must also consider the financial status of the minor parent, and
provide for independent legal counsel at no cost to the minor parent, either
through government appointment and payment or through attribution of the
cost to the adoption agency or adoptive parent. An appropriate statute should
also ensure that a minor parent be provided adequate information about
resources available to aid her in parenting, similar to that given before making a
decision about abortion in many states, before she makes a decision to
terminate her parental rights and consent to an adoption.
A statute should read as follows:
1. A parent who is a minor may relinquish parental rights to the minor
parent's child, and that relinquishment is not invalid because of the
minority of the minor parent.
2. A relinquishment and consent to adoption executed by a minor parent is
not valid unless the minor parent has been advised by an attorney who
does not represent the prospective adoptive parents or the child placing
agency involved in the adoption.
3. An attorney advising a minor parent shall certify for the court in writing
that the minor parent has been advised by the attorney of the:
a.legal rights and responsibility of parents;
b.consequences of termination of parental rights for the legal
rights and responsibility of parents, including rights of
inheritance, confidentiality of adoption records, and legal
requirements for future contact between parent and child;
c.circumstances in which the relinquishment of parental rights can
be revoked and consent to adoption can be withdrawn;
d.availability or unavailability of post-adoption contact agreements
in the relevant jurisdiction and the legal enforceability of such
agreements;
e.legal obligation of both parents to provide financial support for
their child and the availability of state services to determine
paternity and enforce child support orders;
f.eligibility of birth parent and child for state and federal welfare
assistance;

375. Dual representation of adoptive parents and a birth parent inherently involves a conflict of
interests. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'I Responsibility, Informal Op. 1523 (1987). See also In re
Michelman, 616 N.Y.S. 2d 409 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (holding that representing adoptive parents and
biological parent was a conflict of interest and suspending the attorney for three years). But see In re
J.M.P., 528 So. 2d 1002, 1010 (Ca. 1988) (holding that a birth mother represented by a law partner of an
attorney representing the adoptive parents received adequate advice, and there was no need for an
attorney to be completely independent of adoptive parents).
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g.right of the parent to be present in court for termination of
parental rights and/or finalization of adoption and the right to
waive such right; and
h.limitation on any representation of the parent, including a
statement that the attorney will not be representing the parent
in any contested adoption.
4. An attorney advising a minor parent shall further certify to the court in
writing that the minor parent has been informed that he or she has the
right not to relinquish parental rights or consent to the adoption, and
freely and voluntarily relinquishes parental rights and consents to the
adoption.
5. An attorney advising a minor parent shall not charge the minor parent
for services. A court may appoint and pay an attorney to represent a
minor parent in the same manner that an attorney is appointed and paid
to represent a parent in an involuntary termination of parental rights
hearing.
6. If a court fails to appoint an attorney to advise a minor parent, the
adoptive parents and/or child placing agency shall bear the costs of
such representation. The attorney shall disclose to the minor parent
who is paying for the attorney's services. Regardless of the source of
payment, the attorney shall solely represent the minor parent.
VI. CONCLUSION

I don't know where we went to. It could have been the agency; it could
have been a lawyer's office. I think that either Jeanne or Liz from the agency
was there. And someone else . .. a judge, a lawyer?? I have no idea . . . . I
HATED this part.I wanted it to be over. I don't know how I could have done it
either. I know that they read it all to me, over and over again hearing the
words:
"You will no longer be the legal mother of this child.. .no more.. forever,
forever,forever "
It rang though my ears like a harsh tolling bell of death. The words cut me
like razors, I just wanted them to shut up and be done with it. Yes, yes,
whatever .. just be quiet, stop saying that, where is the pen? I signed ... . I
disassociatedfrom it all, andjust went on automatic. I would be strong and do
what I ought, what would make them all happy and cleanse me, make them
proud.No tears, no wavering, determination.m

376. Claudia Corrigan Darcy, The Real Hard Part: Giving Birth and Relinquishment to Adoption,
MUSINGS OF THE LAME BLOG (May 2, 2009), hutp://www.musingsofthelame.com/2009/05/real-hardpart-giving-birth-and.html.
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A teen's unintended pregnancy is a social concern, but more importantly, it
is an individual situation-one that may be of crisis or joy. In the midst of this
emotional circumstance, a minor has to make countless decisions, large and
small, at a developmental stage marked by impaired decisionmaking. It is
likely the adolescent's tendency to live in the "now" and not think of future
consequences that lead to the unintended pregnancy in the first place. And
now, the minor mother has to consider that future in a way unparalleled by any
other decision a teen girl faces.
The dearth of protections given to minor parents before making the
decision to terminate constitutionally protected parental rights and consent to
adoption is inexplicable, especially when considering the solicitude of states to
minor mothers facing the decision to terminate a pregnancy, and the similarities
in the decisions. The lack of regard for the parental rights of unmarried and
teen mothers arises from skepticism about the parenting abilities of young
mothers and the disregard of the mother-child dyad, absent a marriage, as a
family. Negative attitudes about teen pregnancy, unwed pregnancy, and teen
and single parenting invest the decision to terminate parental rights and consent
to adoption by a minor mother with seeming rationality. What other decision
but to terminate parental rights and place for adoption could be made? If that is
the only decision that is rational, we need not concern ourselves with layers of
protection to ensure that the decision is truly intelligently and voluntarily made.
Relinquishment and adoption may well be the right decision, but with the
assistance of counsel for the minor mother, we can ensure that its rationality is
based on the situation of this teen, rather than assumptions about teen parenting
that might be unfounded.
The failure to recognize the mother-child dyad as a family suggests we
need not protect that dyad as we would the normative family. We can then
unmoor the rights of the mother from biology, and insist instead that we focus
only on the best interest of the child, and do so from the proposition that being
raised by a teen mother can never be in the best interest of a child. This is how
we have come to the current state of the law where minor mothers are
relinquishing constitutionally protected parental rights with little consideration
for the decision making deficits of teens. This position ignores demographic
changes in the "normative" family-the norm is less and less the two-parent,
heterosexual household. We must recognize that a single mother and child is a
family worthy of legal protection, including providing legal assistance to that
mother before allowing that family to be broken apart.
Given the legal complexity of the adoption decision, and its lifelong effect
on birth parents and adoptees, all birth parents, regardless of age, should be
provided legal counsel in the process. But at a minimum, minor birth parents,
whose immaturity and inexperience may impair decision making, should have
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the assistance of independent legal counsel when making the adoption
placement decision.

